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This work analyses the evolution of the Local Area Network industry in terms of the
interaction of technological and economic dimensions over time. It focuses in particular
on two suppliers of LAN systems: the access technology industry and the
internetworking industry. Two elements driving the evolution are identified, 1) cross-
substitution among the components when costs are reduced or performance
improved,and 2) the need to preserve the compatibility with existing components or
technologies. The effects of these mechanisms on the dynamics of entry and exit of
firms in both industries are analysed by using the Organisational Ecology approach. We
find that the effects on the dynamic are different depending on the presence or absence
of innovation. These mechanisms may ensure a matching between the two industries
and a virtuous cycle of growth in absence of innovation. Nevertheless, when an
innovation occurs in one of the two industries and the carrying capacity of the system is
altered, the ‘match’ is disrupted and it may be difficult to re-establish a matching
position, thus the virtuous cycle may turn into a ‘vicious one’. An interpretation of the
reasons for this mismatching is given by using the concept of ‘lineage process’ to
describe the application of a technology in new domains and by stressing the role that
elements different from adaptation and availability of resource may play in delaying the
process.
Note to the reader: the legibility of the dissertation is greatly enhanced by keeping the
tables within the text. For this reason we did not create a separate appendix at the end
of the dissertation, even if keeping the tables within the text exceeds the word limit.4
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INTRODUCTION
The main concern of this work is to provide an account and interpretation of the
evolution of the Local Area Network (LAN) industry. Since the function of a LAN is to
provide data communication among different terminal equipment by linking them
through switching points over areas of different size, the service provided by LAN is a
combination of inputs from both the information and communication technology
industries. The technological evolution of the respective components and dynamics of
the industries shape the evolution and diffusion of LANs over time. We concentrate on
the evolution of two of these industries, the industry of access technology and that of
internetworking.  Their interaction is hypothesised to be crucial to determine the paths
along which the diffusion of the LANs has occurred. We will stress mainly the ‘systemic
effect’ as a determinant of the diffusion of LANs but we are not so much interested in
the technological aspects of this effect as in its economic assumptions and
consequences. In particular, we will try to identify the economic mechanisms which, in a
systemic context, interact with the technological dimensions and contributes to shape
the evolution of the industry over time.
Starting from these assumptions, the work tries to answer to the following questions.
What are the economic mechanisms which shape the technological evolution in a LAN?
How do these mechanisms influence the dynamic of the industries supplying the
components to the system? How is the dynamic of the system affected by the evolution
of the single industries?
We will try to answer these question by using what J.A. Schumpeter defined as the
“three techniques (which) distinguish the ‘scientific’ economist from all other people who
think, talk, and write about economic topics”
1: history, statistics and ‘theory’. Any
understanding of economic phenomena is impossible without a reconstruction of
historical, institutional facts which might have influenced the economic outcome.
Moreover, we need to present these facts in such a way to produce meaning and
provide statistics that represent the necessary condition to obtain this goal.
Nevertheless, mere statistical and historical accounts do not provide an adequate
explanation without the support of economic theory. We need a theory both to provide
explanatory hypothesis of the observations made and to suggest additional new
                                                          
1 J.A. Schumpeter (1954), p.12;8
hypothesis to investigate in the future in order to establish new results.
2 The structure of
the present work reflects these purposes.
Chapter one provides a historical account of the evolution of the LAN industry in terms
of technology and economics. The technological viewpoint highlights how the evolution
of LANs results from the interaction of the technical change among the components
(computers, access technology, connecting devices). We distinguish two phases
according to which components seem to guide the process. During the first phase
(1985-1989), it is mainly performance improvements in terminal equipment and
developments in the access technology field that spur the diffusion of local networks.
During the second phase (1990-1997) major changes in the connecting devices
industry together with a stalemate in the access technology industry’s evolution shift the
locus of rapid growth toward internetworking products. For each phase, both the major
technological constraints and the focusing devices are identified. The economic
viewpoint focuses on how the technical changes open up new economic opportunities
for firms in the market and on how firms profit from these opportunities. By analysing
the evolution of the market structure of two segments in the internetworking market
(routers and switches) and by investigating the proliferation of alternative standards in
the access technology field, we identify economic mechanisms including cross-
substitution effects, network externalities and compatibility issues that are influencing
industrial developments.
In chapter two both perspective and method change. The focus is on the dynamic of the
LAN industry as the result of the evolution of the interactions between the access
tecnology industry and the internetworking industry. The main goal is to analyse how
the overall dynamic changes as a consequence of technical change affecting each
industry. The approach we choose for this investigation is that of ‘Organisational
Ecology’ (OE). This choice follows from both ‘practical’ and analytical considerations.
From the practical viewpoint, the data we have on firms’ presence in both industries fit
in the ‘demographic style’ typical of the OE approach. From the analytical viewpoint, OE
uses concepts (legitimacy and competition) which help to connect the demographic
trends with the economic mechanisms identified in the first chapter. The analysis
                                                          
2 “(...)hypotheses of these kind are also suggested by facts (...) but in strict logic they are
arbitrary creations of the analyst. (...) they do not embody final results of of research that are
supposed to be interesting for their own sake, but are mere instruments or tools framed for the
purpose of establishing interesting results”.
J.A. Schumpeter (1954), p. 15, emphasis in the original;9
indicates that different dynamics of the industries should prevail depending upon the
absence or presence of innovations. When rapid innovation is present, the findings do
not seem to fit with the theory. A possible explanation of changes in the growth
dynamics in terms of the interactions between the two industries is suggested at the
end of the chapter.
In chapter three we gather all the threads and try to interpretate the findings in the light
of the existing literature. We stress three points. Minor incremental changes in the
technology and major radical impacts in the market combine in the LAN-Internetworking
industry. This pattern of innovation resembles a ‘process of lineage’ that occurs when
an existing technology branches into new domains of applications. However we argue
that the usual mechanisms behind the lineage process do not completely capture the
dynamic of the process in this case. The separation between adoption and the
availability of resources, which parallels the distinction between legitimacy and
competition as determinants of the industry evolution, blurs in presence of network
externalities and issues of compatibility. Demand and supply become so intertwined
that the evolution of the entire industry depends on their correct matching over time. If
they do not match, the presence of the economic mechanisms highlighted in the first
chapter may delay the application of the technology to another domain.10
CHAPTER 1
THE DIFFUSION OF THE LOCAL AREA NETWORKS
The simplest way to define a Local Area Network (LAN) is as a family of conduits linking
different communication devices. The conduits may consist either of ordinary telephone
wires or more sophisticated cabling and LANs may have different topologies. LANs
differ from the earliest computer networks (60’s and 70’s). These early networks were
highly heterogeneous and ‘proprietary’, developed mainly for intra-company use (DEC
and IBM), and were based on the multi-user System principle. They provided stable and
simple connections between a mainframe computer and ‘dumb’ terminals, but they did
not imply any direct user to user communication.
3 The development of LANs is a direct
consequence of the advent of PCs. PCs and distributed computing provided isolated
single-user environments, but the extension of applications services (mainly printing) to
single users proved to be very expensive (in the first half of the 80’s for instance, adding
a printer to PCs could double their price). Tying users together was perceived as a way
to reduce the costs while extending the access to new information technology. That is
why LANs initially emerged to allow departments to share printers and data and that is
why they were mainly based on existing intra-company networks. Local networks
existed before the introduction and the diffusion in use of microcomputers. As soon as
microcomputers were introduced in the firms’ environment, sharing data and interacting
with other users became a major priority. The perceived ability of LANs to achieve these
objectives and to reduce the total price of equipment for a group of users was a reason
behind the early diffusion of LANs.
1.1 The first phase (1985-1989)
Together with the diffusion of microcomputers, the endorsement of Ethernet as a
standard access technology for LAN communication in 1985 gave a decisive push to
the market. Ethernet as access technology for data communication had been developed
during the 70’s by the Xerox laboratories at Menlo Park. It had been first introduced in
the market in 1979 by the ‘Dix consortium’ (DEC, Intel, Xerox) and, following the
specifications of the consortium, in February 1980 it had started to be considered for
standard definition. In a context of ‘open standards’ the first official document came out
                                                          
3 Any user to user communication was mediated by the central computer.11
in the December 1982 when the IEEE working group ratified the adoption of Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) as access method for
Ethernet. Three years later, after the ‘Dix consortium’ had accepted the new
specifications, the official publication of Ethernet as a standard was made worldwide.
4
Meanwhile, an alternative technology was rising to prominence in the LAN environment
that  aimed to compete with Ethernet. IBM had been experimenting with the Token Ring
technology over its computer system for a decade while new producers joined the group
of sponsors at the beginning of the 80’s.
5 Since most of its characteristics were already
well known, when the Token Ring alternative was introduced in the market by IBM in
1985, several producers (Proteon, Ungermann-Bass, 3Com) were ready to compete
with IBM in the Token Ring environment.
6
Up to the end of the 80’s the Ethernet segment seemed to attract more producers than
Token Ring. As we can see in Table 1 (below) the number of incumbents in the
Ethernet segment was always higher than in the Token Ring segment. Moreover the
presence of many competitors did not prevent new firms from entering the segment as
is shown by the increasing number of new entrants in the Ethernet segment and by their
increasing share of the total new entry. A mixture of technological characteristics and a
‘temporal advantage’, since it had been the first access technology to be standardised
in the market, might have given ‘momentum’ to Ethernet irrespective of some
disadvantages which might have prevented some users from adopting it.
                                                          
4 Ethernet is based upon a bus topology and uses coaxial cables as wiring system. A bus
topology is rather inexpensive. Since each device is an independent unit in the network, its
failure does not affect the performance of the other devices. Nevertheless, on a bus topology the
signal usually weakens as it is transferred through many devices. For this reason, on a bus
topology the scope of the network is limited or the introduction of repeaters is required to re-
generate the signal and avoid a decrease in performance.
See Hegering H.G., Laepple A. (1993), pp.20-25;
5 In the 70’s the ring topology was used to link controllers to looped workstations in the IBM
3600 on-line computer system mainly adopted by banks. In 1981 Proteon shipped a 10 Mb/s
Token Ring to be used by Universities and Research Institutes. See Abrahams J.R. (1991), p.2;
6 In a Token Ring topology each node acts as a repeater of the signal so there are no limits of
speed or distance as in the bus topology. The costs of the network are proportional to the number
of nodes and the use of shielded twisted pair as wiring system makes them a cheap alternative to
Ethernet. Nevertheless, because of the topology, a failed node can break the ring and prevent the
other stations from using the network. To avoid this one terminal is designed as control station.
This improves the reliability compared to Ethernet but increases also the complexity of the
network and the operating costs.12










1985 47 34(72%) 5(11%) 47 43(72%) 1(2%)
1986 72 62(86%) 13(18%) 43 34(79%) 5(12%)
1987 121 99(82%) 29(24%) 74 56(76%) 7(9%)
1988 151 127(84%) 45(30%) 75 65(87%) 15(20%)
1989 152 131(86%) 46(30%) 75 66(88%) 16(21%)
Average 108.6 90.6(83%) 27.6 63 51(81%) 8.8(14%)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communications LAN Firms Directory (several
issues);
Notes: we do not report the data for the Token Bus segment. That is why the single segments do not sum
up to the total; The shares do not sum up to 100% because many firms are present in both segments at
the same time;
Three points were crucial when deciding the adoption of the access technology. First
the kind of media supported. Ethernet supported the expensive coaxial cable instead of
the cheap Shielded Twisted Pair (STP) chosen by Token Ring. Second the extension of
the configuration. The bus topology chosen by Ethernet usually required a higher (and
more expensive) total length of cabling than the ring topology. Third the kind of terminal
equipment attached.
7 The combination of a more expensive wiring system and a wider
area to connect, in most cases represented a disadvantage on the demand side for
Ethernet compared to Token Ring. Regardless these cost considerations, the demand
for Ethernet LANs was also influenced by the presence of higher product quality
competition than in the Token Ring market and by user interest in features and
capabilities. The result was a relatively inelastic demand with respect to price.
8
Moreover the use of an expensive medium over a larger area, which increased the
costs of wiring the network, might have forced adopters not to reverse their decisions
until they had recouped their investments.
                                                          
7 A Data Communication Users’ survey reveals that in 1989, 90.4% of Ethernet users employed
coaxial cables for their networks. 63.5% of them used the network to connect multiple buildings.
Minicomputers were the most common kind of device attached (90.4%). See Data
Communications (June 1989);
8 A survey by Data Communication in June 1987-88 found out that for most of the firms (51%)
the most important factor behind their LAN purchase decision was the availability of features
and the functionality. Price was decisive only for 6% of the firms. Data Communications (1987-
88), June issue;13
The presence of sunk costs on the demand side stemming from Ethernet’s deeper than
Token Rings’  penetration in the installed base, because of the temporal advantage it
enjoyed as well as user preferences reflected in price inelasticity, enabled Ethernet to
attract more producers than Token Ring and this spurred even more its acceptance.
The standardisation of Ethernet boosted the diffusion of LANs but also, represented a
turning point in the diffusion of LANs. LAN diffusion progressively de-coupled from the
demand of computers. Ifwe look at the demand trends, both micro-minicomputers
shipments and LANs connections increase and seem to be correlated until 1986 (see
Tab.2).
The difference in the rates of growth in 1985 (+102% for LANs against +6% and +18%
for micro and mini respectively) reflects partly the ‘bad’ year for computer producers and
the existence of a latent demand from previous microcomputer diffusion for LANs to
satisfy. From 1987 the rates of growth for LANs started to move independently both of
mini and (from 1988) of micro shipments. This reflected a change in priority for firms,
from the need to connect standalone computers and share applications to the need to
connect existing LANs and it also meant the opening of a new phase in the LAN
industry’s growth.
 Tab.2: Computers (and LANs) shipments (and connections) and revenues (1984-1988);









































































Source: Dataquest, Consolidated Data Base (April 1989);
Note: The percentages in brackets show the year to year rates of growth;14
1.2 The second phase (1990-1997)
Three events contributed to the opening of a new phase for the LAN industry: the
diffusion of Ethernet over Twisted-Pair (TP), the increased performances at a lower
price offered by new computers, the booming of the internetworking market. The first
two operated as ‘inducement mechanisms’ and the third represented the solution to the
new constraints posed to the system by those mechanisms.
In 1991, the IEEE working group endorsed Ethernet on Twisted Pair as a standard
(100BaseT standard) received a joint proposal from Hewlett Packard, Synoptics
Communication and Wang Technologies. From a technological viewpoint, the use of
twisted-pair presented drawbacks compared with the performance of coaxial cable,
which was the standard cable system, but twisted-pair had the crucial economic
advantage of being already implemented in the buildings in the form of telephone
cables and the other advantage of having already been adopted by Token Ring as
standard wiring. The use of twisted-pair meant a decrease in the initial costs of
installation
9 of the network, less space required for cabling and cross-connection panels
and the use of one standard type of wiring for all electronic communications. The
opportunity of changing the electronics without changing the wiring increased the
incentive to replace existing computers with new ones. New computers were not simple
substitutes of existing ones but they could provide higher performance at a lower price.
Besides, by the end of the 80’s the relative advantage of tying computers and sharing
applications on a high performance(and expensive) ‘central’ computer, which had been
the main force driving the industry in the early years, had already started to decline. As
the price of microcomputers and peripherals fell, as a consequence of increasing
competition in the computer market, the cost savings from adding one more unit to the
system dropped as well. Firms became more concerned with connecting LANs than
with connecting standalone computers to shared applications. To connect different
LANs new devices called bridges were introduced. Bridges connected different
networks by performing a ‘store and forward function’. They received the data from
different networks and subsequently transmitted them to all of the addresses on all of
                                                          
9 The cost of material and installation for the cabling, including cross-connect subsystems and
outlets, may amount to as much as 40% of the overall costs of a network and it is frequently
estimated at 20% of the total expenditures of the system.15
the connected LANs. Due to their low processing capabilities they could not differentiate
between addresses and they could not support more than one path to each destination.
The consequence of a growing number of hosts and the increasing number of
addresses to which data might be sent, was that in presence of ‘mesh topologies’ they
became incapable of handling increases in traffic.
Thus, as networks were linked together additional costs emerged due to the increasing
complexity of the network. These problems were accompanied by reliability
considerations. Since the fallibility of a system is equal to the combined (stochastically
determined) failure rates of all its components, the more the components the higher the
overall failure rate, the higher the costs of support and maintenance for the network.
When LANs are linked together, additional layers are added on, but the greater the
number of layers (and of units), the greater the complexity of the network. From an
economic viewpoint the price of connecting simple networks into complex networks is
not generally a linear function of the number of simple networks since it is affected by
the topology, traffic saturation at the level of backbone and also by the compatibility
among the network protocols. To add each network is not always the same since as the
complex network grows larger the price of connecting and providing the service to
individual simple networks tends to rise. Additional costs arise when the LANs to be
connected have been grown up separately, as was the case of many intra-firms
networks, according to different strategies, supported by different access technologies
and supporting different protocols.
 10
Bridges were becoming increasingly incapable to cope with those problems of
complexity because of their specific technological characteristics. In a increasingly
complex network environment, bridges were very liable to faults and they lacked an
organisation which might help to manage the network and control the flow of the data.
Reducing the complexity of the network and increasing reliability and its ability to be
managed so as to avoid additional costs became the priority for customers.
                                                          
10 The price of complex networks to simple networks is expressed by the general
formula: pN p C F s =+ () ( ) 1 where  ps is the price of the simple network, CF is a complexity
factor expressed as a percentage of the total simple network cost, N is the number of nodes
(networks) connected. When the complexity increases further, the formula becomes:
pN p C F s
SCF =+
+ () ( )
() 1
1where SCF represent the additional burden imposed by the growing
complexity.
Brandon Walker R. (1988): ‘Into the woods: a LAN manager’s field guide’, Data
Communications, Nov. 15 1988, pp.23-41;16
Moreover, both the increased performance of computers connected in a the network
and the diffusion of twisted-pair pointed to the lack of speed in data transmission as the
main constraint which, in a given LAN environment, might restrain the system from
further expansion. The increased performance of computers demanded more
bandwidth availability to transmit the higher quantity of the data needed to be
processed. The adoption of twisted-pair and the subsequent reduction of costs
increased the opportunity to further extend the LAN. The combination of the two might
end up with worsening the lack of speed problem and reducing the economic benefits of
connecting LANs.
New solutions were required both to exploit the technological opportunity represented
by the improvement of computers’ performances and to cope with the increasing
complexity of the network. The quest for these solutions opened up a second phase in
the history of the LANs industry where, beside the evolution of the access technology,
the technological evolution of the connecting equipment started to play such an
important role that a separate industry was created (the internetworking industry). The
history of the second phase is a mix of fast growth and increasing competition in the
internetworking equipment industry and of uncertainty and proliferation of different
standards in the access technology.  Each industry deserves a separate analysis and to
it we now turn.
1.3 The Internetworking Industry
The rapid establishment and growth of the router market offers evidence about how
quickly suppliers coped with the new priorities and users accepted the new solutions.
The router segment represents the clearest example of fast and continuous growth in
the internetworking market from 1989 up to the present (see Tab.3).
Starting in 1989 the router
11 market has passed through three stages, each opened up
by some kind of technological innovation (either radical or incremental). The
                                                          
11 A router is a device used to ‘segment’ the network into a number of regions in which the
traffic is distributed between nodes within the region. This reduces the complexity of the system.
The main function of the router is to connect different regions and, to perform this task, a router
must be capable of interpreting the different network protocols to detect both the sender and
receiver addresses with streams of  data in order to forward the data. The hardware architecture
of a generic router is made up of network interfaces plugged into a backplane. The system
constructed upon several boards and includes a CPU which handles the coordination of the
router’s functions, such as setting up signal reception and transmission and actual packet17
introduction of the ‘multiprotocol function’ was the innovation that opened up the market
and engaged router producers in a close and direct competition with bridges makers.
 Tab.3:US Internetworking Market: Total Revenues ($ millions) and
Rates of Growth (%) per market segment (1989-1996);
Year Bridges Routers Switches
1989 202 85 -
1990 254(25%) 170(100%) -
1991 274(8%) 275(62%) -
1992 388(42%) 623(126%) -
1993 438(13%) 1108(78%) -
1994 263(-40%) 1356(22%) 232
1995 - 1953(44%) 710(206%)
1996 - 2763(41%) 2461(246%)
Source: Data Communications Market Forecast (several issues);
At the end of this period the segment entered a ‘diversification stage’ (1992-1994) in
which new and old producers started to offer ‘scaled down’ versions of previous
products following mainly two different innovative strategies software-only routing or
hardware-based routing. With the diffusion of the switch technology in 1994, the router
technology entered another phase, marked initially by intense competition, and then by
progressive convergence with switches. Since this pattern represent the main feature of
the second phase, we now turn to an analysis of its technological and economic
implications.
1.3.1 The router segment
From an economic viewpoint, the feature of the router segment common to all these
stages was the combination of an increasing competition with a relatively stable market
environment. High rates of entry and exit for firms and decreasing prices combined with
relatively stable market shares and the proliferation of new segments over time as the
process went on. Tab.4  shows how the initial stock of incumbents increased almost of
                                                                                                                                                                            
forwarding, of non volatile RAM for storage and configuration of the information and of a
‘watchdog timer’ to restart in case of system failure. See Boulè R., Moy J. (1989), ‘Inside
Routers: a Technology Guide for Network Builders’, Data Communications, Sept 21, pp.53-66.18
50% over five years as a net result of a steady increase of new entrants and a decrease
in the number of firms leaving the segment.




(AS A % OF INC.)
ROG FOR NE TOT. EXITS
(AS A %OF INC.)
ROG FOR EXITS
1993 66 66 - - -
1994 58(-12%) 20(30%) -70% 28(42%) -
1995 66(14%) 32(55%) 60% 24(41%) -14%
1996 95(44%) 44(66%) 38% 15(23%) -38%
1997 98(3%) 28(29%) -36% 25(26%) 66%
AV. 77(12%) 38 -2% 23 5%
Source: Author’s calculations based on The Data Communications Intenetworking Firms’
Directory (several issues);
Note: TOT INC stands for Total Incumbents, ROG stands for Rate of Growth, NE for New Entry,
AV for Average
 As a result of this dynamic, competition seems to have increased and driven the prices
down, even if this did not seem to have given the market a more competitive structure.
A comparison of market shares between 1990 and 1996 (in Tab. 5) shows an increase
in the CR4 going toward more concentration even if the players are the same and they
have just reshuffled their positions.
 Tab.5: Worldwide Router Market: Revenues’ Market Shares (1990-
1997)
Firms 1990 1997
Cisco Sys. 35.2% 63%
DEC 20.3% 2%
3Com 13.2% 6%





Source:IDC(1990)andDataquest(1997) taken from Data Communications
*Note: Bay Networks was created in July 1994 from a merger between
Wellfleet Communication and Synoptics Communications;19
A closer look at the data can help to shed some light on this apparent paradox. Our
data about entry and exit cover the entire period of diversification which, as we saw
above, was characterised by the absence of major innovations, and the early years of
the ‘convergence stage’ with the opening up of the switches segment. During this
period, total revenues in the router segment continued to grow and averages prices to
fall, but at different rates according to the different subsegments. Table 6 reports the
average prices for the two main subsegments in the router market together with the
total entries into them. As we can see, in the first two years, prices decreased more in
the  multiprotocol subsegment than in the access router subsegment. From 1995
onward the pattern is the opposite with the prices continuing to fall but at a higher rate
for the access router subsegment than for the multiprotocol one. Parallel to this, new
entries continue to increase in the access router segment but to decrease in the
multiprotocol segment.




Year Tot NEs in the
segment but NOT in
the industry
Total NEs both in










1993 - - 5,008 30 9,739 48
1994 9 11 4,945 23 8,771 21
1995 10 22 3,779 24 8,410 8
1996 10 34 2,944 33 9,325 3
1997 2 26 3,250 19 - -
Source: Author’s calculations based on Data Communications Internetworking Firms’ Directory
(several issues);
Competition did seem to affect the multiprotocol more than the access router sub-
segment at the beginning because more firms coming from both other sub-segments
within the router market, entered this subsegment immediately.  In the access router
segment, prices started to fall moere quickly than in the multiprotocol segment only in
1995 partly because the switches segment took off and partly because the number of
NEs increased. In the former case, competition increased because a possible product
substitute opened up a new segment at the industry level. In the latter case competition
came from within the router segment mainly from firms which had previously entered20
the multiprotocol sub-segment. It seems that increased competition from a product
substitute exerted a higher effect on routers’ prices than increased competition within
the product segment.
Increased competition within the router segment is less effective because of higher
barriers to entry represented by the high capabilities required to provide the software
responsible for the multiprotocol routing function. Most of the new firms which entered
the sub-segment during the diversification stage could not provide the routing function
in their products which had to be handled by the PCs, while established firms
responded to the challenge of new entrants with new products that contained
proprietary software and hardware. So if we look at the Concentration Ratios of the
single market sub-segments within the router market (Tab.7) we realise that the
multiprotocol sub-segment is more concentrated than the remote access sub-segment.
Competition in multiprotocol sub-segment may have increased as the result of new
firms entering the segment, but it is more unlikely that new entrants will affect the
market shares of the market leaders.
 Tab. 7: US Router Market: Subsegments’ Revenues Market Shares
Multiprotocol segment Remote Access Segment
Firms 1997 1996 Firms 1997 1996
Cisco Sys 64% 58% 3Com 34% 6.2%
Bay Networks 10% 12.7% Ascend 27% 22.7%
3Com 4% 4.6% Cisco Sys 18% 11.4%
IBM 2% 2% Shiva 5% 8.2%
Motorola 2% 5.5% Us Robotics - 26.1%
Others 18% 17.2% Others 16% 25.4%
CR4 80% 80.8% CR4 84%* 68.4%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Dell’Oro Group Reports (Nov. 1997);
*Note: The increase in the CI4  is due to the acquisition of US Robotics by 3Com in 1997;
Increased competition from outside the market is more effective in disrupting
technological barriers than increased competition within existing segments, even if it
exerts its effects more slowly on those sub-segments where the barriers to entry are
higher. Thus within sector entry appears to have had less impact on market outcomes,
includin relative growth, than inter-segment competition.21
1.3.2 The switches segment
In 1994, the opening of the switches market exerted  a deep impact on the sales of the
other segments in the internetworking industry. Routers sales slowed down and the
bridges segment experienced a negative growth in sales for the first time in its history.
The introduction of switches was a definite hit on the bridges market which had already
been seriously injured after the competition against routers at the end of 80’s, but at the
same time switched networking also represented a window of opportunity for firms to
undermine, for the first time since its foundation, the growth of the router segment and
to lay foundations for future changes in the entire industry.
The first switch was introduced in 1990 by a US based company, Kalpana, as an
attempt to satisfy the constantly increasing demand for bandwidth coming from the new
high performance PCs and applications which were more and more linked over
Ethernet LANs. Due to the high uncertainty on the access technology side, where the
proliferation of many alternative high speed technologies had not yet led to the
endorsement of any one of them as the alternative standard to Ethernet, innovating at
the level of the internetworking component was almost ‘compulsory’ for producers to
overcome this performance deadlock. The idea behind the switches is to bring into
networking a principle employed by telephone technology where, when the stations are
connected to a switch, the switches ensure the exclusive availability of the entire
bandwidth of a communication channel (10 Mbit/s in the Ethernet case).
The early switches introduced in the market could be considered from a technological
point of view a logical development of bridges. Like bridges, early switches operated at
layer two of the OSI protocol scheme and like bridges there were incapable of
distinguish among all the different addresses where the data packets could be
forwarded to. These limits were mainly due to the configurations of the CPUs’
architectures which did not allow the devices to set up and maintain the address tables,
the forwarding and the management processes. These first generation switches had all
the shortcomings which had led to the levelling off of the expansion of bridges and to
their partial substitution by routers after the late 80’s intense competition: few ports
supported, relatively simple address tables to avoid delays in the storing and forward
process, no capabilities to segment the network, exposure to broadcast storms. They
were faster than bridges, but they supported only situations in which the traffic was
mainly local, and LANs architectures were flat. For these reasons, when they early22
appeared in the market they were closer substitutes for bridges, and they engaged a
direct competition with them rather than with routers, which gave the bridges market a
death blow.
Second generation switches incorporated a high speed search mechanism which
allowed them to search the address tables very quickly and minimise the delay between
receiving and forwarding a data packet. This enabled them to support more ports, to be
used in relatively complex LANs environments and also to perform some functions at
higher functional levels,
12 challenging what until then had represented the exclusive
technological domain of routers. This domain of application distinguished them from all
the other internetworking products and supported very high growth rates in their market.
This entry into router’s technological field was the consequence of technological
improvements which affected the forward capabilities of the CPU both at the software
and at the hardware level.
13 At the software level, the ever more widespread adoption of
RISC processors (in particular the Intel i960)  induced producers to focus on the quality
of software code (e.g. its overall operating speed) or on a specific technological feature
of code (e.g. real time processing of addresses), enhancing the performance of the
switches and make it relatively easy to upgrade the switches via available software
downloading. This flexibility was obtained at the expense of performance since the
intrinsic limits of the architecture may prevent switches from supporting the data
processing as the number of ports increases. High performance and flexibility of
upgrading, seemed be enjoyable only by limiting the number of ports on the switches.
At the hardware level, the picture is different. Here the main improvements stemmed
from the re-configuration of the switches’ hardware by using ASICs (Application Specific
Integrated Circuits). In the specific case of switches, the advantages of ASICs in carry
out specific tasks, were exploited to process the data packets at the maximum speed of
the transmission medium. Thanks to their high level of component integration, ASICs
                                                          
12 There are two types of layer three switches according to the method of forwarding they
employ: packet-by-packet (PPL3) and cut-through (CTL3). PPL3 switches examine all packets
and forward them to their destination by using the same routing protocols used by router (Open
shortest path first), the same routing tables and understanding the network topology. They are
identical to routers since they operate completely at layer three and they are faster than routers.
CTL3 switches operate at the layer three just to detect the destination of the data packet by
opening only a small portion of it and then they switch the rest of the packet at layer two
benefiting from the low delays and the high throughput provided by the switches.
13 This section draws heavily on Hein M.-Grifiths D. (1997);23
can produce in one chip the processing power of five to ten RISC chips but the relevant
codes are implemented directly in the hardware which is very difficult to modify. Any
time the switch needs to be upgraded, a new ASIC chip must be produced. ASICs are
relatively cheap to manufacture especially in great quantities and this translates into
greater cost-effectiveness (and lower prices) for the ASIC-based switches compared
with software-based ones, but the process of development of a new chip always takes a
long time and is very risky. To diminish risk manufacturers usually develop their ASICs
in two stages. First they integrate their codes into components called Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) which are cheaper to produce than ASICs. Then
they modify the code and replace the FPGA with pure ASICs.
FPGA usually process the code slower than ASICs but, since upgrading the code is
quicker than developing a new code, producers can offset the costs of a lower initial
performance with the benefits coming from a reduction in the total development time.
Once the new code is developed and implemented on new ASICs, economies of scale
enable low costs.
14 We have summed up the trade-offs between software based and
hardware based switches in Tab. 8.
From an economic viewpoint, the innovation represented by the switched architecture
exerted a great impact on the internetworking industry. A sign that the new product had
fulfilled a latent demand for more bandwidth in the market, was an immediate increase
in sales aided by falling prices. As a result, in 1997 an Ethernet or Fast Ethernet switch
was priced (on average) only 35% more than an access router. The price premium was
even smaller as switches had higher performances.
                                                          
14 How  many ASICs to implement in a switch is a choice of producers. Two strategies are
usually followed. They can either use a single central ASIC for the switch or implement a
separate ASIC for each port. In the first case the switch will be less expensive but, with a lower
port density, more keen to be used in smaller networks. In the second case the switch will be
more expensive but also more scalable.24
Tab. 8: Comparison between ASIC and processor based switches;
Function ASIC switch Processor switch
Processor ASIC Standard processor
Design Design specially tailored to requirement Chipset  developed  for  general
requirement
Instruction sets All IS implemented in the hardware Additional software required
Processing speed High Low
Modifications Difficult  to  implement Can be implemented by changing the
code
Scalability High Low scalability
Risk Very high Low
Cost High Low
Source: Hein M.-Griffiths D. (1997), p.142;
 Tab.9: US Internetworking Market: Switches Segment: Revenues’ market
shares (1994-1997);
Firms 1994 Firms 1997
Kalpana** 34.7% Cisco** 23%
3Com 10.1% 3Com 16.4%
Cisco** 8.7% BayNetworks* 15.4%
UB Networks 6.5% Cabletron 12%
Artel 5.9% FORE 2.9%
Net. Peripherals 5.8% IBM 2.6%
Alantec 4.1% Digital 2.2%
Lannet 2.9% Xylan 2.2%
Plaintree 1.0% HP 2.2%
Xnet 1.0% Madge 1.8%
Synoptics* 0.1% Intel 0.8%
Others 19.3% Others 21.1%
CR4 60% CR4 66.8%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Dataquest Inc.(1994) and Dell’Oro
Group Report (1997);
Note: *Synoptics merged with Wellfleet in July 1994 to create Bay Networks;
         **Cisco acquired Kalpana in 1995;25
The commitment of suppliers to address demand came together with a change in the
structure of the segment, although this change was different from the one experienced
in the router segment.
A comparison between the market shares in 1994, just after the boom of the sales, and
at the end of 1997 (see Tab.9 above), shows a movement toward consolidation in the
industry ending with an increase in CR4.
Contrary to what had happened in the router segment where the increase in the CR did
not bring about major changes in firms’ ranking, here the segment experienced a
marked shuffle as the result both of a change in the relative position of incumbents and
of the entry of new firms. Unfortunately we are not able to fully reconstruct the pattern of
entry and exit over the period 1994-1997 which would be helpful in understanding the
dynamic behind this process. two of the important changes can, however, be identified.
First, among the incumbents which strengthened their position, two of them did it
through acquisitions. Cisco acquired Kalpana, the market leader and the pioneer in the
switches segment, in 1995, Synoptics merged with Wellfleet to create Bay Networks in
1994. As in the routers’ market, mergers and acquisitions seemed to have increased
the overall level of concentration. Second, among the leaders in 1997 only Cabletron
was not in the market three years before and its fast rise seems to be more a reflection
of its capacity to master products across different access technologies than a
consequence of a deep commitment to develop and market the switched architecture.
15
Beside these firms, all the other incumbents at the end of 1997 had not been in the
industry in 1994. This reinforces the ‘shuffle hypothesis’ and suggests that new entrants
might have been mainly responsible for it.
The ‘switch revolution’ is very much related to the evolution of the access technology
field. When it occurred in 1990, a swarm of alternative access technologies was both
competing in the market to become ‘de-facto’ standards and being backed within official
standard committees to be ratified as ‘de-jure’ standards. Once they became
established, it became clear that switches represented not only another solution to
boost bandwidth, but also an alternative which decoupled, from the first time since their
births, the evolution of the internetworking industry from the evolution of the access
technology. The option to increase bandwidth and to handle different access
                                                          
15 At the end of 1997 Cabletron was the only firm, in the switches market, delivering products in
each of the access technology sub-segments. Cabletron had acquired this capacity to master
several access technologies from its leading position in the hub segment.26
technologies at the same time without recabling changed the priorities for firms. It
became essential to integrate the new switched architecture on the large installed
Ethernet base rather than to find a substitute to Ethernet. This induced firms to supply
Ethernet based product in their product lines and also ended up with revitalising the
oldest LANs’ segment. This can be quickly and quickly grasped by looking both at the
relationships between switch revenues and the access technologies and at the pattern
of new entries in the switches segment for a specific year 1997 (See Tab. 10). The
Ethernet and Fast Ethernet segments take the highest share of the total revenues
among the alternatives. Ethernet’s switches are not only the cheapest, thanks mainly to
the highest total number of incumbents in the segment, but are  the segment is also the
segment which still attracts the highest proportion of NEs. This clearly supports our
claim about changing priorities.
16
Tab. 10: US switches market: 1997 average uncorrected prices, market shares and NEs per access
technology;

















ATM 9,953 7% 7 26 22.5%
Giga-bit Ethernet 36,499 NA. 8 14 25.8%
Ethernet and Fast Ethernet 4,841 80% 17 74 54.8%
Token Ring 8,397 7% 1 8 3.2%
FDDI 15,872 6% 0 3 0%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Data Communications LAN Firms Directory (several issues);
The Ethernet and Fast Ethernet segments take the highest share of the total revenues
among the alternatives. Ethernet’s switches are not only the cheapest, thanks mainly to
the highest total number of incumbents in the segment, but are  the segment is also the
segment which still attracts the highest proportion of NEs. This clearly supports our
claim about changing priorities.
17 The same argument about the ‘compatibility driven
                                                          
16 Since our data on firms’ mobility do not distinguish between Ethernet and Fast Ethernet,
maybe most of the new firms in this segment provides fast Ethernet switches. Anyway this do
not seem to undermine our claim that NEs are mainly driven by compatibility considerations.
17 Since our data on firms’ mobility do not distinguish between Ethernet and Fast Ethernet,
maybe most of the new firms in this segment provides fast Ethernet switches. Anyway this do
not seem to undermine our claim that NEs are mainly driven by compatibility considerations.27
process of entry’ is reinforced by the fact that more firms enter the Gigabit Ethernet
switches segment than the Token Ring one even if, given the higher relative price for G-
bit Ethernet, new entrants may be more motivated by a lure for high profits than by a
large installed base to sell their products to. It is important to stress how, among the
new alternative technologies segments, ATM has the same share of revenue of Token
Ring with more incumbents in the market and attracts a higher number of new firms. In
this case the compatibility issue does not make the difference but, given the high
expectations on ATM both on the performance (integration of audio, video with data
transmission) and on the bandwidth it can provide, firms may be attempted to enter the
segment to gain a first mover’s advantage over the competitors.
These data can also be used to partially address the relevant question of the economic
effects of the technological substitutability between switches and routers. As we saw
above, especially after the introduction of the second generation of products, layer three
switches’ suppliers really challenged their router’s competitors by providing cheaper
products displaying the same functions with higher performances. Competition from the
switches segment seemed to hit the router market more intensively than increased
competition within the segment had done in the past. Routers seemed bound to
experience the same pattern of decline that bridges had already experienced. Actually
this did not happen nor has it yet occurred. Revenues for switches continue to soar, but
revenues for routers keep steady and this seems to contrast with the substitutability
argument and with what happened in the past.
This apparent contradiction. The first explanation stresses only the role of the
technology in shaping the outcome as the relevant point to consider. According to this
explanation, the technological fields which both routers and switches belong to are too
similar to prevent them from converging on just one product. The fact that it has not
happened yet is mainly a consequence of a lack of ‘stimuli’ from within the technological
system for that kind of integration to occur. Were that sort of pressure to appear or to
turn into effective competition, maybe as a consequence of further ‘push’ coming from
technological improvements in the terminal equipment connected to the network, the
convergence would accelerate and the technologies would converge or the one
performing better would prevail.
This explanation indicates an important point when dealing with technological
innovations in a system since it hints at the relationships among the components of  the28
technical systems as having a major responsibility for market evolution over time. Data
on firm mobility suggest that in 1997 25% of incumbents in the switches segment  were
active also in the router segment and that the share (over the total new entrants) of new
entrants in both segments is higher than the share of NEs only in one of the two
segments, supporting the argument about the common technological base.
Nevertheless this argument misses one point. Technological pressures might be
present, but if there is not an economic incentive to innovate, extending the field of
application of an existing technology ‘per se’ will not be economically successful. In the
specific case of the substitutability between switches and routers the economic benefits
from the convergence in terms of transfer of a common knowledge base among
different products, reflected in the diffusion of common design practises and
manufacturing methods, must be valued against the losses firms may incur once they
have to phase out already existing product lines to avoid expensive overlaps. To
embrace the new switched architecture might not be profitable for router producers,
even if meaningful from the technological viewpoint, if they have to scrap their installed
base. A better solution would be for them to have the two markets coexist and this
seems to be a better explanation for what is happening now.
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1.4 The evolution of the access technology
The development and diffusion of the switch were also a consequence of the stalemate
which occurred in the access technology field at the beginning of the ‘90s when new
solutions were required to overcome the bandwidth shortage problem. The main reason
why Ethernet started to represent a bottleneck for further development of LANs was the
so called ‘total and node throughput issue’. The total throughput is the total amount of
traffic that can be carried overall. For a given amount of bandwidth, as more users
started to be added to the network each one received a smaller share of the total
bandwidth available. The node throughput is the amount of traffic that one device (either
server or workstation) can transfer or receive from the network. The potential gain in
performance obtainable from fast servers decreased if they had to let other users share
the network.
                                                          
18 Moreover, data on sales suggest that the router sub-segment where the growth is actually
coming from is the high end of the market, as if routers were losing their status of
internetworking products and becoming sorts of WAN interfaces. This envisages a future of
coexistence for switches and routers when the former are used in the low-end of the backbone
and the latter to connect LANs to the backbone.29
Overcome this bottleneck was perceived immediately as the main priority by firms in the
industry and several alternatives were quickly introduced in the market. At the end of
1993 there were ten access technologies competing in the market and only one of them
(FDDI) has had already been endorsed officially as a standard. Four of them
implemented a token passing architecture (FDDI, CDDI (FDDI over copper), FDDI for
multimedia, FFOL (FDDI follow-on-LAN the eventual successor of FDDI at 2.4Gbit/s)),
three of them were Ethernet-based (Fast Ethernet (CSMA/CD), Fast Ethernet
(100Base-VG), Isochronous Ethernet) and two implemented a switched architecture
(ATM, Fiber Channel).
This proliferation of alternatives was the consequence of specific strategies of the
vendors to seize a share of the market as large as possible in the hope of getting their
access technology standardised through either a ‘de facto’ or ‘de jure’ standard-setting
processes which would officiallly endorse one of the alternatives. According to this logic
FDDI the first standard to be officially endorsed and the first technology to have entered
the market should have enjoyed a relative advantage over the other alternatives.
Actually this did not seem to happen. Table 11(next page) reports the total number of
firms and new entry in the hub market according to access technology supported over
the period 1993-1996.
19 The share of firms into the FDDI segment over the total has
never been higher than 21%, a peak reached after four years after the standardisation.
Fast Ethernet (CSMA/CD) reached a higher share (25%) only two years after the
standardisation even if it was introduced later than FDDI. Moreover, the average price
of both the alternatives have always been lower then FDDI (See Tab.12).
                                                          
19 Since we lack data about the number of sponsors of the access technologies over the period we
are analysing, we use data about the hub market as a proxy of the diffusion of each technology to
investigate the incentive for producers to enter the market into a specific segment. Hubs are
networking devices which are mainly used to link existing LANs either together or to the
backbone. Since new access technologies performed at higher speeds than Ethernet or Token
Ring, which were implemented by most of the existing LANs, they needed hubs to be connected
to existing networks. Obviously hubs are sold in a separate market whose price and
concentration depends on the capacity of firms to design and manufacture products rather than
simply choosing the access technology to support. However with these caveat we think they
could provide indirect evidence at least of the trend in the diffusion of the access technology too.30
Tab.11: US Hub market: Total Incumbents tot New Entry and new entry as a share of total
incumbents(%) per Access Technology (1993-1996);
Year Tot INC Tot NEs FDDI Tot NEs Fast
Ethernet
Tot NEs 100VG-Any LAN
1993 71 8 - -
1994 108 14(13%) - -
1995 65 13(20%) 3(5%) 4(6%)
1996 71 15(21%) 18(25%) 5(7%)
Average 78.75 12.5 10.5 4.5
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communications LAN Firms’Directory (several
issues);
Note: TOT INC stands for Total Incumbents, NE for New Entry;
Tab.12 : US hub market: Average Uncorrected Prices per access
technology;
Year FDDI 100 VG-Any LAN Fast Ethernet
1993 11,706 - -
1994 6,612 - -
1995 6,667 2,448 2,238
1996 6,470 2,049 2,373
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communications LAN
Firms’Directory (several issues);
  
FDDI had been the first alternative to be standardised. FDDI’s high price attracted new
sponsors by rewarding them with higher profits than producers of rival technologies.
Relatively low barriers to entry the FDDI segment  represented a further incentive for
new firms to sponsor it. Despite all these advantages the evidence suggests that FDDI
did not benefit. On the contrary Fast Ethernet although it was a second comer was
immediately recognised as viable and profitable by the producers.
There are two possible explanations of this outcome. One is that compatibility was the
main concern behind firms’ decisions about which alternative to sponsor. In the case of
the access technology, compatibility means both conformity with the already installed
access technologies and conformity with the cables already in place. Fast Ethernet
used the same topology and the same packet format of the existing 10 Mbs Ethernet31
and the costs of connection were very low since a hub equipped with a memory buffer
could handle the speed difference. Fast Ethernet worked over cheap and already
available copper cables, instead of the  expensive optic fibers supporting FDDI. FDDI
clearly had major drawbacks with both these points when compared to Fast Ethernet.
The second explanation deals with performance. Here FDDI had more advantages than
the competing technologies especially because fiber optics solved the problem of
electromagnetic interference whose limitation was the main challenge to transmission of
data at higher speed over copper. Nevertheless, the performance yardsticks became
ATM and Fiber Channel and not the Ethernet upgrades. Being switched architectures,
ATM and Fiber Channel allowed for the simultaneous transmission of packets at lower
speed instead of the transmission of a single stream of packets at a higher speed as
happened with the shared architecture. For this reason they could ensure better
performances than FDDI both in interactive connections and in the integration of data,
video and voice.
Both FDDI and Fast Ethernet were shared architecture and they were outcompeted
along this dimension  by the ATM and Fiber Channel alternative. Nevertheless FDDI
presented drawbacks also in terms of compatibility while the presence of a wide
compatible installed base guaranteed the viability and profitability, via rapid adoption, of
Fast Ethernet. Moreover, as we have seen above, the introduction of the switch in the
internetworking market, which revitalised the segment of previously adopted access
technology such as Ethernet, probably focused the development of innovations in
access technology upon alternatives compatible with the existing ones.
This combination of factors stresses the importance of the compatibility over others as
the central concerns which drove the decisions of the producers about which alternative
access technology to sponsor. The motive of preserving compatibility with existing
technologies enhanced the viability of certain technologies, delayed the development of
other alternatives some of which were less viable but other which were more viable
20,
and thwarted both the strategies of the first movers and the attempts of official
committees to establish just one standard.
                                                          
20 This is the case of ATM. See below for a discussion of this.32
Conclusion
The picture of the evolution of the LAN industry sketched in this chapter has stressed
some of the typical features of technical systems. As LANs are made of several
different components coming from different markets, the evolution of each market
influenced the diffusion of LANs through the effect of technological and economic
complementarities.
21 These effects displayed at different points in time and according to
different intensities. Very often they amplified each other and the final supply and
demand for LANs were shaped by these interactions.
After an early phase in which the diffusion was ‘pulled’ by the economic benefits of
linking computers together, we got through a period where the ‘technology push’
coming from both the evolution of the access technology (Ethernet over TP) and the
improvement of computers’ performance introduced new opportunities but also set new
technological constraints. The exploitation of this new opportunities and the attempt to
overcome the technological constraints set new economic priorities for firms and
opened up the second phase of the evolution of the industry with the creation of the
internetworking market and with the introduction of new access technologies.
The separate analysis of both has highlighted the importance of several economic
factors in shaping their evolution such as direct and cross-substitution among products,
the importance of the compatibility and of the depth of installed base. To understand
how  these factors combine together we now turn to a different kind of analysis.
                                                          
21Technological complementarities are due to features of the computer hardware entering the
final service. Economic complementarity is the result of changes in the costs and features of
other components affecting the data transmission and reflected by the price of the final service
provided. Both effects are mainly due to the systemness according to which changes in each of
the components within the system may affect the dimensions responsible both for scale and
scope economies.33
CHAPTER 2
THE DYNAMIC OF THE SYSTEM
If our goal is to understand the evolution of the LAN industry by investigating the
dynamics of its components, the analysis of the previous chapter is partial and biased. It
is partial because we have not developed a complete picture of the evolution of  the
internetworking industry but only of two separate segments. To investigate the
interactions  between  different markets during the diffusion of LANs, we should consider
how markets have grown up and changed their structures over time as a consequence
of the interactions among firms within each market. The analysis is biased because,
although we may have an idea of the mechanisms behind the adjustment process
following the introduction of an innovation, we have not specified the dynamic of the
industry before the innovation occurred. Thus, we cannot comment upon the effects of
the innovation on the relationships between  the two markets.
To overcome these problems we should compare the dynamic of both industries before
and after the introduction of a significant innovation like that of switches. By doing this
we can provide a picture both of the ‘intrinsic’ dynamic and of the effects of a shock
represented by an innovation on each industry separately. Unfortunately, because of
the lack of data, we can not fully analyse the pattern of entry and exit of the access
technology industry from 1985 to 1989 and of the internetworking industry from 1993 to
1997. Nevertheless we think our analysis offers significant insights. First, between 1985
and 1989 access technology was relatively stable; Major technological innovations did
not occur until the beginning of the 90’s. We may assume that the industry displayed its
‘intrinsic dynamic’ in this period. Second, between 1993 and 1997 the internetworking
market was hit by the innovation represented by the introduction of the switch and its
pattern of entry and exit clearly indicates the changes in the environment following this
shock.
We expect to find different dynamics of firm growth and entry in the two industries for
these two cases. The question of the source of these dynamics is an important issue.
One possibility is that the difference merely reflects the effect of the environmental
shock. A second is that change in the relationships between the two markets followed
the shock but was not directly related. Once known the pattern of entry and exit of each
market and the history of the diffusion of LANs so far, we can make some hypotheses34
on the evolution of the interaction between the access technology and the
internetworking market over time and try to solve this puzzle.
2.1 The dynamic of the access technology industry (1985-1989)
We start with the analysis of the dynamic of the access technology industry between
1985 and 1989. As we have seen this was a period of consolidation for Ethernet,
without innovations after the standardisation of the access technology. We want to
investigate the evolution of the growth rate of incumbents over time which is defined as
the difference between the rate of entry and of exit of the firms from the industry.
The evidence is shown in Tab.13. Over the period both the number of new entries and
of the exits increases monotonically and although the new entries are never higher than
the number of firms leaving the industry, the number of total incumbents increases
monotonically too. If we look at the rates of growth (ROGs) the pattern is still uniform.




(AS A % OF INC.)
ROG FOR NE TOT. EXITS
(AS A %OF INC.)
ROG FOR EXITS
1985 47 47 - - -
1986 73(55%) 43(91%) -8% 17(36%) -
1987 124(70%) 74(101%) 72% 23(31%) 35%
1988 154(24%) 75(60%) 1% 45(36%) 96%
1989 159(32%) 75(48%) 0% 70(45%) 55%
AV. 111(42%) 63 16% 39 62%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communications LAN Firms’ Directory (several
issues);
Note: TOT INC stands for Total Incumbents, ROG stands for Rate of Growth, NE for New
Entrants, AV for  Average
Total incumbents and new entries seems to display a similar decreasing pattern after an
increase in the early years. The ROG for total exits increases and then decreases until
the end of the period.
Reasons behind entry, exit and persistence in the industry are different since they are
three different processes. However, the existence of similar patterns suggests that they
can be related.
Both the number of new entries and the number of the total incumbents is small at the
beginning but new entry represents a high percentage of the total incumbents. They35
both increase but when the number of new entrants level off at the end of the period
they represent a smaller share of the total incumbents with respect to the beginning of
the period. Both the number of exits and their share of the total incumbents are small in
the early years. They both increase but, at the end of the period when the number of
incumbents in the industry is about three times its initial level, the share of exit to the
total number of incumbents is higher than it was at the beginning.
This seems to suggest a positive linear relationship between the density (total
incumbents) of the industry and the total number of entry and exit. Nevertheless, if we
look at the ROGs the pattern becomes more complicated. Disregarding the monotonic
increase in the total incumbents, ROGs both for entry and exits first increase in the
early years then decrease at the end of the period. The relationship between density
and the ROGs does not seem to be monotonic. It is still positive for low levels of density
up to a certain point, but beyond that it becomes negative. For the rate of entry the
pattern is the following.
Diagram 1






















The evidence suggests that the increase in the number of new entries begins soon after
the standardisation of Ethernet and Token ring. Several reasons might have induced
firms to enter the industry in this time period.
The endorsement of Ethernet as a standard might have reinforced the advantages it
already enjoyed as a consequence of having been the first to be introduced in the
market. Before the endorsement, when Ethernet was sponsored only by the Dix36
consortium and its diffusion still limited, the costs of sponsoring  it for a new firm should
have been more or less equivalent to the costs of developing an alternative access
technology. The expected benefits were higher since, thanks to network externalities,
previous adoptions might favour the adoption of the existing technology by new
adopters.
22 A strategy of low pricing, which might have enhanced the diffusion of a new
alternative technology over the existing one, might have appeared risky and
impracticable in a context of already decreasing prices.
The flow of entries was probably reinforced by other factors. An increase in total
revenues parallel to the increase in production might have induced some firms to enter
attracted by the lure of profits. For this to be effective, the profit margins should not
have been eroded by the decline in prices. We do not have evidence to support this
claim. However had this effect operated, this alone could not explain the reasons
Ethernet kept its advantage over the alternatives
23. The main point is that the
endorsement acted as a source of legitimacy encouraging more firms to enter the
market and sponsor that existing standard instead of an alternative one.
The positive relationship between density and rate of entry continues until 1987 when it
turns into a negative relationship. One possible explanation of this change in the pattern
is that by then the number of incumbents in the industry had reached the point where
the benefits in terms of legitimacy new firms could get from the addition of other firms to
the industry, were offset at the margin by the increase in density brought about by the
presence of more firms in the industry.
24 The fact that the peak in the ROG for NEs
occurs in 1987 in coincidence with the highest decrease of price over the period seems
to confirm this claim. Moreover, in an oligopolistic market, the increase in density
                                                          
22 The existence of benefits deriving from the presence of network externalities is confirmed by
the fact that Token Ring which was marketed only one year after Ethernet has never reached the
popularity of Ethernet even after its endorsement as a standard.
23 The only evidence we can rely upon, coming from the internetworking industry is that, to
implement a device over token ring,  the other available technology at that time, has always been
more expensive than to do it using Ethernet. Moreover, Token Ring markets have always been
more concentrated than others with higher prices and so less competition.
24 “(...) a form receives legitimation to the extent that its structure and routine follow the dictates
of the prevailing istitutional rules (...) an organisational form is istitutionalised or legitimated to
the extent that it has a taken for granted character”. See Hannan M.T., Carrol G.R. (1992), pp.33-
34;
This definition stresses the concept of legitimacy at the level of firms’ organisation but it may be
refrred also to the technology in the case of the innovating firm. The innovationg firm has major
chances to introduce and support the diffusion of an innovation if the innovation conforms to the
institutional rules (the case of official standardisation) or if the technological peculiarities of the
innovation are well known and easily accepted by the majority of adopters.37
multiplies the number of possible interactions among firms and the number of possible
results firms have to consider as a consequence of their strategic behaviours. This
increases the general level of uncertainty and might prevent more firms from entering
the market.
We might think that the same forces underlining the relationship between density and
the rate of entry affects the relationship between density and the ROG of exits too.
According to the theory, increases in density lower the rate of exit of firms through an
increase in legitimacy. This occurs up to a certain point when competition, brought
about by further increases in density, overcomes the legitimacy effect and induces an
increase in the rate of exit. As density continues to increase, the rate of exit increases
as well to a peak when the given resources of the industry have been almost completely
exhausted. As a result we should expect to find a U-shaped relationship with high exit
rates both at small and high level of density and a decreasing, but from a certain point
increasing, pattern in between.
25
Actually this pattern does not seem to fit our data. The scattergram in Fig.2 (next page)
may either fit a linear positive relationship or a non-monotonic relationship (increasing
up to 1988 and then decreasing) but it does not seem to conform to the theory.
At low density we have low rates of exit which increase as the density increases. The
data seem to capture only the competition effect responsible for the upward sloping part
of the U-shaped curve and neglect the legitimacy effect. This pattern is puzzling since,
as we have just seen, a legitimacy effect does operate in the case of new entries. The
puzzle is partially solved by requiring that legitimacy is supposed to exert at the same
time two opposite effects on firms. The legitimacy effect is most effective at a low level
of density but it exerts opposite effects on firms entering and leaving the industry. In the
case of entries, legitimacy sustains the entry process at low density when the rate of
entry is low. In the case of exits the exit rate is high because a small number of
incumbents at the beginning prevents the technology from gaining the legitimacy it
requires to become established.
Diagram 2
                                                          
25 See Hannan M.T., Freeman J. (1989), chap.6;38




























The point is how the growth rate of incumbents gains momentum as a result of the
interaction of these two processes.
If the share of new entries over the total number of incumbents is high as in our case
(see Tab 13 third column above), then a high rate of exit within new entries (a ‘churn’ of
the new entrants pool) due to low legitimacy may boost the overall rate of exit. The
overall rate of exit might be low at a low level of density but this does not necessarily
imply that the negative relationship between density and legitimacy is not effective. If a
higher number of new firms leaves compared to the total incumbents and if the share of
new entry over total incumbents is high, then the rate of exit might be low at the
beginning when only firms from the initial stock of incumbents may leave but it
increases as new firms enter and immediately leave the industry. The evidence in
tables 14 and 15 seem to confirm this hypothesis.
The pattern of exit for incumbents as a share of total exit is decreasing in the early
years of incumbency (1986) but then it increases in the following years (Tab.14). The
pattern of exit for new firms as a share of total incumbents is decreasing over time for
any given year of entry (Tab.15) but as we can see from the average cumulative shares
new firms leaving represent always high shares of total incumbents (61% after four
years, 42.5% after three years and 37.5% after two years).
26  A smaller number of
incumbents seems to leave in the early years than subsequently because total exits are
                                                          
26 We got these data from Tab.15 by calculating the simple means of the percentages after two,
three and four years of permanence in the industry.39
boosted by the increasing number of new firms which enter and leave the industry
immediately.
 Tab. 14:US LAN Industry: Pattern of Exit for Incumbents as a % of INC in the











1985 N A --- -
1986 NA 36%(36%) - - -
1987 NA 25%(61%) 31%(31%) - -
1988 NA 13%(74%) 18%(49%) 36%(36%) -
1989 NA 13%(87%) 23%(72%) 30%(66%) 45%
TOTAL NA 87% 72% 66% 45%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communication LAN Firms’ Directory
(several issues);
Note: CUM stands for cumulative;
Tab. 15:US LAN Industry: Pattern of Exit for New Entry as a % of INC in the
year of exit (1985-1989);








1985 - 36%(36%) 16%(52%) 5%(57%) 4%(61%)
1986 - - 18%(18%) 5%(23%) 5%(28%)
1987 - - - 27%(27%) 14%(41%)
1988 - --- 2 2 %
1989 - ----
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communication LAN Firms’ Directory
(several issues);
Note: CUM stands for Cumulative
What emerges is that the density dependence for ROG of exit may depend on the
‘competition effect’ but actually this competition is only within new entrants and the
different dynamics of new entrants and incumbents do not cancel the legitimacy effect.
Instead they might be a consequence of the it. Soon after the standardisation of
Ethernet which ‘legitimised’ the technology and set the pace for the early entries,
incumbents enjoyed the benefits deriving from low competition and network externalities
on the demand side. At this stage, because of the relative small installed base, we may
assume that both incumbents and new firms enjoyed quite similar benefits and had
quite similar low rates of exit. When the potential demand for linking computers became
effective in 1987, incumbents further strengthened their position and the incentive for
new firms to enter increased. As a result new entries peaked but the widening of the
installed base for early incumbents might have created an entry barrier within the40
industry between them and new firms
27. As a consequence new firms continued to
enter, at a decreasing rate, but since they were incapable of competing effectively
against early incumbents they mainly left soon after their entries. The peak in the 1988
rate of exit appears mainly due to the high number of new firms leaving the industry and
that when the rate of exit fell after the peak it was mainly because the entry rate was
nearly approaching zero.
Since at the end of the period both the rate of exit and the rate of entry conforms to the
theory, our pattern seems also to be consistent with the explanation according to which
at high level of density the resource constrain seems to affect the overall pattern more
than at the beginning. We will deal extensively with this point when talking about the
relationships between the two industries at the end of the chapter.
2.2 The dynamic of the internetworking industry (1993-1997)
The dynamic of the internetworking industry looks very different from the one just
analysed. Recall that between 1993 and 1997 the industry has been struck by the
introduction of the switch which opened up a new market. The patterns for incumbents,
total entry and total exit (Tab. 16) is not monotonic but fuzzy.




(AS A % OF INC.)
ROG FOR NE TOT. EXITS
(AS A %OF INC.)
ROG FOR EXITS
1993 103 103 - - -
1994 98(-5%) 33(32%) -68% 38(37%) -
1995 161(64%) 108(110%) 227% 45(46%) 18%
1996 139(-14%) 53(33%) -51% 75(46%) 66%
1997 105(-24%) 32(23%) -40% 66(47%) -12%
AV. 121(5%) 66 -39% 56 24%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communication Internetworking
Firms’Directory (several issues);
Note: TOT INC stands for Total Incumbents, ROGstands for Rate of Growth, NE for New
Entrants,AV for Average;
Their number increases at the beginning of the period and it decreases after a peak.
The trends of ROGs reflect this pattern. In particular the ROG of entry is always
                                                          
27 Market shares are not available so we cannot comment upon the consequence on the
concentration index.41
negative except for the sharp increase (+227%) it experiences in 1995. This peak in the
entries is the main feature of the pattern and, since it occurs one year after the boom in
the sales of the switches, it is likely a consequence of their introduction. It corresponds
also to the peak of the density for the period and this hints that there is some kind of
relationship between them.
In the case of the access technology the pattern clearly displayed a non-monotonic
relationship between density and the rate of entry. This appears to be the result of the
change over time in the effects that increasing density exerted on legitimacy and
competition. At low level, the density had a positive influence on the rate of entry
because it increased legitimacy. At high level the density had a negative influence
because of the high competition which prevented new firms from entering.
In this case the above pattern does not seem to fit our data on density and rate of entry.
The scattergram below (see Diag.3) highlights a positive but linear relationship between
density and rate of entry as if it captures only the ‘legitimacy effect’.
Diagram 3
























We need to understand what was the source of legitimacy in this case. The increase in
the rate of entry between 1994 and 1995 was so sharp that it could not simply reflect a
steady process of legitimacy like the one we have analysed in the Ethernet case.
Moreover, no official endorsement of the product as a standard had occurred to justify
such a rush.
Actually, when the switch market boomed the product had already achieved legitimacy.
Two events had contributed to that. Switches were not a complete novelty for the42
market since they had been introduced four years before as substitutes for bridges. This
helped to reduce the technological uncertainty and improve their acceptance once their
enhancement had made them potential technological substitutes for routers. Moreover,
their prices had already dropped so quickly as to make them also an economic
alternative to routers. The perspective of facing such a high demand attracted many
producers in the market regardless of the prospect that the low price might have
prevented them from making high profits. This,more than the ‘legitimacy effect’ alone,
explains why the peak of entry coincided with the peak in density.
But there is another point to stress about legitimacy. Data shows a decreasing
relationship between the rate of growth of new entry and the previous number of new
entrants. Had the density exerted a positive effect on the rate of growth of entry only by
increasing the legitimacy we should observe a positive relationship between the rate of
new entry and the total number of new entrants since it is assumed that an increasing
number of new entrants, and not only a high number of incumbents, functions as a
positive signal for other new firms, encouraging their entry.
28
This does not seem to fit with our data (see Diag.4 below). Instead there does seem to
be a negative relationship between total new entry and the ROG of new entry. The
wave of entry in 1994 attracted new firms immediately but their entry did not seem to
trigger any signalling effect to further entries.
Diagram 4






















The weakness of the signalling effect in the context of internetworking industry is
confirmed also for the rate of exit. Diag.5 (next page) plots the total number of exits
                                                          
           
28 See Hannan M.T., Freeman J. (1989), p.205;43
against the rate of exit. The data are very poor and trying to fit any kind of relationship
from just three observations is not possible. However some qualitative comments can
be made starting from the theory. Usually the theory predicts a positive relationship
between the number of recent exits and the actual rate of exits. This assumption
reflects the conviction that firms leaving the industry are a symptom of the approaching
exhaustion of the carrying capacities signalling to other firms that they had better leave
too.
29
The carrying capacity summarises the dependence of the rate of growth of populations
upon different dimensions of the social and economic environment. Among the others,
the carrying capacity is affected by changes in the level of resources which can be
mobilised, by changes in the institutional and selection processes and by the degree to
which the resources are fixed to other organisations. The introduction of the switches
clearly altered all these dimensions. By pushing forward the technological frontier the
innovation allowed firms in the industry to obtain scale economies in the production of
switches and relaxed some of the constraints which had previously prevented routers
producers from achieving those economies. By incorporating new functions it changed
the relevant parameters affecting consumers’ choice and this change in the pattern of
demand had repercussions on the selection process. By spurring competition within the
industry it reshaped the boundaries among the segments. Since the innovation changed
the carrying capacities, recent exits could not represent any ‘relevant signal’ of
resources constraint to other firms and the rate of exit decreased.
Diagram 5
                                                          
29 See Hannan M.T., Freeman J. (1989), p. 272;44




























In our case a negative relationship, which contrasts with the theory, seems to fit better
than a positive one. The reason is that the mechanism just described above cannot
work in this context.
How can we reconcile the positive relationship between density and the rate of entry
with the weakness of the signalling function given the additional presence of a weak
legitimacy effect?
A possible explanation is to hypothesise that after the big swarm of new entry, signals
of legitimacy came mostly from incumbents entering the switch segment who had
previously been in the router segment. Being a transfer within the internetworking
industry, this ‘entry’ does not affect the total number of entrants (which decreases) but it
sustains the overall level of density and it represents a signal which continues to
influence positively the rate of entry. The evidence provided in the previous chapter
about the ‘convergence’ between the two technologies seems to support this claim.
30
Another explanation is that some firms left the industry and then entered again. Since
the rate of exit is positive, we cannot reduce the dynamic of exit to a simple shuffle
within the segment which did not affect at all the overall level of density, or its effect on
legitimacy. However if some firms which had left the industry re-entered it soon after,
then the overall effect on the level of density might be negligible, but it might represent
                                                          
30 See chapter 1;45
an incentive for other firms to enter.
31 That some firms entered again the market after
leaving is indicated by the non monotonic pattern in Table 17 reporting the pattern of
permanence for new firms as a share of the total number of incumbents for any given
year of entry. If we look at the average shares for a given time interval we realise that
after one year new entries still in the market are 29% of incumbents, 22% after two
years and 26% after three years. The increase in the third year is clearly a
consequence of the re-entry of firms which had left previously.
32
 Tab.17: US Intenetwoking Industry: Pattern of Permanence for
New Entrants as a % of Incumbents in the year of entry (1993-1997);
YEAR OF
ENTRY/PRESENCE
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
1993 100% 62% 47% 44% 35%
1994 - 34% 8% 9% 7%
1995 - - 67% 26% 9%
1996 - - - 38% 19%
1997 - - - - 30%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on The Data Communication Internetworking
Firms’ Directory (several issues);
The above evidence seems to confirm at the industry level the pattern we had already
commented upon in the previous chapter. It is the economic substitution effect that
drives the dynamic. The economic benefits of the adoption of the switches seemed to
have been clear right from the start to suppliers. Nevertheless, the early cross-
substitution effect between switches and bridges delayed the impact of switches on the
router market, contributed to dilute the legitimacy effect overtime but at the same time
influenced the density of the internetworking industry. As a consequence the positive
relationship between density and the rate of entry still held but new entries concentrated
in one specific year as the result of a rush-in more than of the steady process of
‘legitimacy acquisition’ which seems to be quite weak. This weakness is reinforced by
the absence of any signalling effect as it is confirmed by the negative relationship
between recent entries and exit and the rate of entry/exit. After the ‘big rush’ new
entries did not seem to trigger further entries but density continued to affect the rate of
entry through the inter-segment entry and exit processes as a result of the technological
convergence between routers and switches.
                                                          
31 This seems to grasp what occurred between 1996 and 1997 when, despite a fall in the total
number of incumbents and in the total number of entries, the rate of entry increased.
32 See note 4 about these averages;46
After the analysis of both the industries we can sum up and comment upon the findings.
The two industries differ in their dynamics, in the mechanisms underlying and explaining
the dynamics and in the relevance of the approach we applied to study those dynamics.
The evidence from the access technology industry confirms the theory. The density of
the incumbents would seem to be the relevant dimension to study to grasp the dynamic.
The density-dependent concepts of legitimacy and competition would seem to
synthesise well the role of network externalities, standardisation and first-mover
advantage in explaining the dynamic.
On the contrary the evidence from the internetworking industry does not seem to fit the
theory. Density seems to be still relevant but legitimacy and competition alone do not
predict the cross-substitution effect, the alternative between standardisation and
specialisation, the relevance of sunk costs which as we have seen have influenced the
decision of the firms and shaped the evolution of the technology and of the industry. We
are now going to use these results to answer the question we introduced at the
beginning of the chapter.
2.3 The dynamic of the system
The approach we have chosen to undertake the investigation of the industries’ dynamic
suits as well for analysing the interactions between the two industries. Once we have an
idea of what lies behind the intrinsic rates of growth of the industries in the absence of
any resource or competitive constrain (mainly network externalities in the access
technology case) and behind the ‘environmental shocks’ affecting their carrying
capacities (mainly the cross-substitution effect in the internetworking case), the last step
is to understand how these effects influenced the relationships between the two
industries over time.
According to the organisational ecology approach two different populations (markets)
compete if each population lowers the carrying capacity for the other through a linear
effect on the density of the competitor. Competition can be summarised a coefficient
telling the probability of inter-population interaction in resource acquisition relative to
intra-population acquisition.
Eventually the coexistence between two populations requires that the effect of density
on exit rates within a population must be stronger than the competitive effects between
populations. Similar populations can coexist only under a precise ratio of their carrying47
capacities. Any shock to the system altering existing carrying capacities is likely to drive
the system away from the special condition supporting coexistence. The new
equilibrium is unstable and the system will not tend to restore itself to the condition of
coexistence.
33
From the economic viewpoint, access technologies and internetworking products
represent different markets whose evolution are not disitnct. During the evolution, new
potentialities of the system (in terms of better performance, new functions) became
effective in two ways.
In the case of the access technology,network externalities induced the density-
legitimacy process through which the endorsement of an access technology as a
standard impacted the market. The improved technology allowed LANs to perform
better the same functions performed by existing networks, to perform them at a lower
cost, and to perform new functions as well. Prices decreased and what happened at this
first stage was a movement downward the overall demand curve. This demand was
partly met by an installed base of previously existing devices, and partly by a new
supply coming from new producers (either of computers or of internetworking devices)
which enter the market. This reinforced the previous decrease in the prices by lowering
further the cost of LANs. As a consequence, the supply curve of the system shifted
downward leading to an equilibrium position at a lower price than the initial one.
The switching innovation ended this ‘virtuous cycle’. From the start switches were
priced at half the access technology (FDDI) with which they were competing as a
solution to the problem of ‘bandwidth shortage’. Demand for switches increased while
demand for FDDI remained stagnant and this prevented competitors from entering the
FDDI market.
34 On the supply side many high speed access technologies were
proliferating at the same time as alternatives to upgrade Ethernet. High uncertainty
about which one would prevail in the end as a standard restrained the suppliers either
from entering the market or from endorsing one of them. The absence of competition
within the market weakened any incentive to innovate and cut prices of the access
technology. Instead in the internetworking market switches’ price continued to decrease
as they became widely adopted and suppliers flocked to the market.
                                                          
33 See Hannan M.T.,Freeman J. (1989), chapter 6;
34 See chapter 1;48
The overall result was that innovation in the internetworking inhibited innovation in the
access technology industry and ended up by reinforcing the diffusion of previously
adopted technologies (Ethernet) or by focusing innovation toward new access
technologies compatible with the existing ones (Fast Ethernet). The absence of the
‘reinforcing systemic effect’ prevented the system from reaching an equilibrium or from
converging to an universal standard. In this second case, demand increased as the
price of equipment decreased but the supply curve did not shift downward since costs
for suppliers of access technology remained the same or increased.
2.4 Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the effects on the industries’
dynamic of the technological evolution which we highlighted at the end of the previous
chapter. We needed a theory which could link the effect of network externalities and
cross-substitution among products to the rate of entry and exit in both industries, which
could account for the effect of environmental changes on the rates, which could give
some hints about the interaction between the industries to provide a picture of the
evolution of the system. The ‘organisational ecology’ approach has revealed suitable for
the purpose.
By decomposing the growth of an industry into three effects (an intrinsic growth rate,
resource availability, interaction with another industry) and by stressing the importance
of industry density as the mechanism driving the growth of the industry through its effect
on legitimacy and competition, we grasped both the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the
industries, which have their own dynamics, and the temporal heterogeneity due to the
change over time in environmental conditions.
For a given carrying capacity, legitimacy and competition have proved to be effective in
explaining the industry dynamic. In this context the coexistence of the two industries
turned into a ‘virtuous cycle’ which supported the evolution of the system. When change
occurred in the carrying capacity as the consequence of an innovation, legitimacy
weakened the ‘virtuous cycle’ and turned it into a vicious one where a new equilibrium
at the system level seemed hard to achieve again.49
Two different mechanisms seemed to operate differently according to the environmental
conditions. Network externalities seemed to be a more effective in a relative static
context. Cross-substitution effects seemed to be stronger when a shock hit the system.
This raises new questions whose meanings and theoretical implications we will address
in the next chapter.50
CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNETWORKING
As we have seen so far, the evolution of the LANs has configured them as complex
systems resulting from the match of  many components coming both from the electronic
and the communication technology field. Both the ‘systemic’ and the ‘complex’ feature
should be considered when trying to assess technically and economically LANs’
performance. The ‘systemic’ nature pointed to the kind of relationships among the
different components and the different companies and sectors producing these
components. Contrary to what happens in telecommunications systems, on a single
LAN each component is an equal partner in the network space. This absence of any
kind of ‘hierarchy’ among components seemed to increase the complexity of the system
as the network continued to grow. The ‘complex’ nature of LANs implied that, like in any
electronic system, their fallibility is proportional to the number of their components.
3.1 The technology
The technical trade-offs between those two dimensions have been shaping the
evolution of the technological trajectories and have also affected the economic
performances of the firms and the dynamic both of the internetworking and of the
access technology industry.
Due to the interaction between all the components the effects of technological
innovations have configured two trajectories over time. At the level of components, one
trajectory of technological innovation in the internetworking industry, common to several
products, resulted in an increase in the number of functions available on a single unit of
equipment after a new generation of products had been introduced in the market. This
occurred both when bridges substituted routers at the end of the 80’s and when
switches became potential substitutes for routers starting in mid 90’s. At the systemic
level, the increasing integration of more and more functions at the level of a single
component due to technological innovations resulted in a decrease of the complexity via
a decrease of the total number of components in the system.
35
                                                          
35 The costs of an electronic system are closely related to the number of components both
because of manufacturing costs and system failure rates.51
As a consequence of this pattern of evolution two regularities have emerged. First the
technological shift associated with newly introduced innovations, has never implied a
great leap forward in terms both of the kind and of the quantity of knowledge to be
mastered by firms. In spite of this, and this is the second point, the commercial impact
of the innovations has always been dramatic.
From the technological viewpoint, innovations rarely involved technological
breakthrough and they were most commonly changes at the system level. Switches for
instance simply introduced in the data communication field a technology used in
telephony communication. For this reason at the beginning they were not significant
innovations but only substitutes for bridges. Only with the incremental improvement in
the store-and-forward system due to the application either of RISC architecture or the
use of ASICs gave them the opportunity to substitute for routers in high speed
applications. Moreover the diffusion of switches was triggered by the adoption of more
powerful computers within the network and it benefited from the stalemate in access
technology development which continued to support substantial installed base of
incompatible equipment.
From an economic viewpoint, the increasing technological complexity at the product
level has either opened up new sub-segments within an existing market or created
completely new markets. The former was the case when two products co-existed
because they performed different functions (‘new application effect’) as in the
multiprotocol and access routers’ sub-segment. In the latter case the products might not
coexist because they both performed the same function and new products brought
about new features which the old products did not incorporate (‘complete substitution
effect’). During the evolution of the internetworking industry the last pattern repeated
both patterns of activity when routers were introduced as substitute for bridges and
when switches substituted for routers.
36
However, the complete substitution did not occur immediately in the case of
internetworking devices. Old products continued to perform their function soon after the
introduction of potential substitutes. As the substitutes got through different generations
                                                          
36 It is important to stress how, in the case of switches, first generation products were more
substitutes for bridges than for routers suggesting that the technological upgrade requires a new
product to pass through all the previous steps before becoming a perfect economic substitute.
One may speculate whether this tendency is linked to the process of winning legitimacy in the
market.52
usually their prices decreased and their performances improved. This pushed the old
product more and more to the boundaries of the market until the complete substitution
occurred.
37 As we have seen something different is happening nowadays to routers
whose co-existence with switches does not seem to be threatened by the upgrade of
switches which, on the contrary, seem to stimulate a convergence of the technology
applied to the two equipment.
3.2 The process of lineage
The pattern highlighted above seems to be consistent with the so called ‘process of
lineage’ a pattern the literature has stressed in the case of other technologies when the
technological innovation first created new applications and then, once evolved, entered
the domain of application of the precedent technology.
38 In these cases the technology
seems to evolve gradually and the radical change arises from the application of the
technology to new markets.
The point is to understand whether the evolution into other domains is constrained and
what are eventually the focusing devices ‘channelling’ the evolution.
According to the theory two elements drive this process of development. The first
element is adaptation since the technology is supposed to adapt to the particular needs
and requirements of the market it addresses. From this viewpoint, the impact of the
changes on the market depends on how the innovations are valued in terms of existing
preferences in already established markets. Since innovations are valued according to
established parameters when they hit the market, to enhance their acceptance they are
often introduced into new market segments where the preferences are closer to the new
characteristics or have to be built up completely.
The second element is the abundance of resources which are required to support and
favour the penetration of the innovation into new application domains. With a given
amount of resources, the pace of the change usually depends on the kind of
                                                          
37 Bridges disappeared completely only when switches entered the market, but at the beginning
they coexisted with routers.
38 See Christensen C. and Rosenbloom R. (1995); Levinthal D. A. (1998); Rosenbloom R. and
Cusumano M.A. (1987);53
technological change. Given the technological paradigm, changes may occur either in
the single component at the detailed design level or throughout the system.
39 This
distinction has given rise to a classification of the kind of innovation according both to
where it occurs (either at the component or at the architecture level) and to its
intensity.
40
The concepts of adaptation and availability of resources stress how firms’ behaviours
are shaped according to the kind of technology they are dealing with, the pattern of
demand they confront and the structure of the industry they operate in. These
influences are dealt in the literature with the concepts of opportunity, appropriability,
cumulativeness and knowledge base.
41
Opportunities are a measure of the incentives to engage in innovative activity and
represent the potential source of depletion of the available resources. Appropriability is
related to the possibility of profiting from the innovation by protecting it from imitation.
Cumulativeness refers to the property of the innovative activity to reinforce itself once
occurred either at the single firm or at the industry level. The knowledge base
summarises the characteristics of the technology both in ‘intensive’ terms (the
dichotomy tacit vs. codified knowledge) and in ‘extensive’ terms (when several
disciplines must be integrated into the technology).
Usually, if high opportunities combine with high cumulativeness at the firm level and
high tacitness of  knowledge, appropriability increases and may prevent new firms from
entering the industry. In this case incumbents enjoy relatively low competition and can
benefit from high profits. Moreover, a first mover’s strategy may allow incumbents to
seize and keep a good share of the market.
If considered at the industry level cumulativeness is strictly linked to appropriability and
the ‘intensification’ of the knowledge base. Since codified knowledge generates
                                                          
39 See Clark K.B. (1985) and Tushman M.L., Anderson P. (1986);
40 Handerson and Clark identify four types of innovations. Incremental change reinforcing the
expertise both in the architecture and in the component technology; Modular innovation
affecting the technology at the component level but not changing the architecture; Architectural
innovation changing the way components work together; Radical innovation when a new
component technology has a pervasive effect both on the component and on the way they
interact together.
See Henderson R. M. and Clark K.B (1990);
41 See Malerba F. and Orsenigo L., (1993);54
externalities which may turn into increasing returns supporting the diffusion of a
particular kind of innovation, the dynamic may turn out different from the previous one.
In this context of low appropriability, high opportunities, associated with high availability
of resources or with the absence of any resource constrain at all, favour the ease of
entry of new firms in the industry. A high degree of knowledge codification may
reinforce this process
42 and in this case a first mover strategy is not enough to reduce
the competitive pressure on incumbents.
This picture changes if the technology displays a high degree of pervasiveness. If the
core of technical knowledge can be applied to a range of different alternative solutions,
which seems to be a condition to enter different domains of application, then firms may
be induced to either diversify or specialise their activity according to a low or high
degree of cumulativeness respectively. In this case even the presence of high
opportunity and cumulativeness cannot prevent established markets from being invaded
by products with a high degree of substitutability. This may induce a coexistence of
product at the market level.
This pattern captures the evolution of the internetworking industry from 1993 to 1997.
The opening up of the multiprotocol sub-segment with high priced, high performance
products had set the basis for product specialisation. The knowledge required to
develop the software for routing among different protocols provided the basis for a
highly cumulative process. The appropriability increased and rose some barriers to
entry. This did not completely prevent firms from entering the segment even if, as both
market shares and CR4 indicate
43, it did prevent new entrants from competing
effectively against the leaders. CR4 increased in 1997 but the market leaders were still
the same of seven years before.
In the presence of high technical pervasiveness, which stimulated the competition from
the switches industry, these technological barriers are revealed to be weak. This
weakness brought about two consequences. Firstly, following the increasing
competition from switches, router prices fell and, as a consequence, the incentive to
enter the subsegment decreased slowing the rate of new entry. Secondly, it prevented
firms in the router market from shifting from a strategy of product specialisation to one
of product standardisation. Prices might have declined anyway as the consequence of
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falling costs had firms achieved economies of scale in production. This would have
allowed firms to keep their margin of profit unaltered while enhancing the competitivity
of their products and increasing the quantity of products shipped. Multiprotocol routers,
regardless their higher price when compared to access routers, were becoming a
commodity but the process of standardisation driven by economies of scale and
learning occurred too slowly to allow effective  price competition with switches once
they were introduced in the market. Unfortunately neither data on costs nor on the
margins of profit are available to shed some light on this hypothesis even if the stability
of market shares seems to confirm, indirectly, a sort of stability of the margins of profit.
Nevertheless the increasing number of firms entering both the switches and the router
market at the same time after 1994 is a signal that a reduction in the barrier to entry had
occurred as a direct effect of pervasiveness. In this context, specialised firms are
vulnerable, especially if they delay in moving toward the exploitation of scale
economies.
On the contrary, the establishment of the switches market provides an example of how
an aggressive lead in the exploitation of scale economies might represent a good
strategy for exploiting the technical pervasiveness and for entering a new application
domain for the technology. As we saw, the changes in market shares for switches’
producers between 1994 and 1997 reflected a re-shuffle more than a simple
consolidation of leaders’ position as had happened in the routers’ market. New firms
entered the market and some incumbents became leaders by acquiring other
incumbents. All this happened while a new generation of products was about to be
introduced creating a ‘window of opportunity’ for firms to enter the market. Thanks to the
pervasiveness of the technology, new entries were mainly driven by the expectations of
future gains coming from the substitution of routers with switches, but to seize the
opportunity they needed to be quick in cutting costs and to ship as many products as
possible to enhance the substitution process.
The diffusion of ASICs as an alternative to software-based switches helped them to
achieve this goal. ASIC-based switches, once developed, offered all the advantages in
scaling up production and cost cutting typical of semiconductors. However, to grasp the
opportunity new firms could not spend a long time developing their own design, bearing
the high costs and facing the high uncertainty. The decision to acquire incumbents56
seemed to be the best solution to avoid delays.
44 The only problem with this kind of
strategy was the eventual product overlap resulting from the acquisition. Because of the
cross-substitutability, router manufacturers acquiring switch producers could end up
reducing the size of the market and the amount of the rents coming from the existing
product lines.
45 By exploiting scale economies suppliers had the opportunity to reduce
costs and to practise a policy of aggressive pricing which enhanced the diffusion of the
product and offset the falling of the rents.
3.3 What difference does it make?
Beside those elements, in the case of LANs, network externalities and compatibility
issues deriving from the ‘systemic feature’ of the product have acted as a major
focusing device in the process of lineage. This peculiarity influenced the process more
than the resources availability and the adaptation envisaged by the theory. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, the shift in the carrying capacity was essential to favour
the diffusion of the switches innovation in the case of the internetworking industry, but
because of the lack of a ‘reinforcing mechanism’ coming from the access technology
side the equilibrium between demand and supply could not be restored at the system
level.
3.3.1 The supply side
Network externalities are usually intended as ‘positive consumption externalities’ and,
so defined, they are mainly considered to be a ‘demand side phenomenon’. In the
presence of network externalities, the value received by the single user depends
positively on the total number of users consuming the good via either a direct or a
mediated effect.
46 As the scope of the network increases, the utility of the single user
increases leading other users to enjoy a higher benefit.
                                                          
44 For an attempted analysis of the acquisition strategy in the case of Cisco Sys. see: Fontana R.
(1998);
45 This trade off between being lock-in to an existing technology and the ‘cannibalisation’ of the
existing product lines based on previous technologies is common in presence of high opportunity
and cumulativeness and it is worsen by the compatibility issue which may delay the substitution
as we have seen above.
46 See Katz M.L. and  Shapiro C. (1985);57
For this process to operate as a dynamic mechanism, compatibility among the different
products should be assumed. If this assumption is made we can also assume that the
extent of the installed base, when it becomes larger than a ‘critical mass’, operates as
an almost automatic adoption-inducing mechanism.
47 If we drop this assumption, then
network externalities become relevant from the producers’ point of view too.  When
compatibility is not assumed to be ‘ex-ante’ producers may display different strategies
for influencing the decisions of the users in the hope of reaching the critical mass that
makes the process self-reinforcing and allows them to seize the market. They can
support an existing standard in the hope of benefiting from an already existing installed
base but in this case they have to sustain the competition of existing incumbents. They
can introduce a new incompatible technology and enjoy all the benefits coming from
being the only sponsors but in this case they cannot rely on an already existing installed
base.
Existing products shape the needs and set the parameters driving the selection process
on the demand side but also both the depth of the installed base, especially for the
access technology, and the need to preserve the compatibility with the existing devices,
especially in the internetworking market, limit the number of new specifications available
and constrain the strategies of producers. Because of the past history of the market and
of the technology, the new domains of application for the technology are not all equally
likely.
48 The effect on the development of the new technology may be varied and the
diffusion of the innovation into other domains of application might be either enhanced or
retarded.
The history of the LAN diffusion has provided many examples of this. In the router
market the multiprotocol function, which in 1989 opened up a new, more concentrated
and highly priced sub-segment, represented a sort of ‘gateway technology’
49 the system
needed to overcome the bottlenecks which might have inhibited its further expansion.
Because of the expectations of a widespread adoption of the product and the lure of
high profits ensured by the peculiarity of the status of ‘gateway innovation’ many firms
entered the sub-segment irrespective of the high technological barriers to entry which
demanded a relevant effort in terms of resources availability to prospective entrant.
                                                          
47 See Arthur W.B. (1989);
48 The process is non-ergodic or path-dependent. See Arthur W.B. (1987), David P.A. (1988);
49  ”they  (gateway technologies) make it technically feasible to utilise two or more
components/subsystems as compatible complements or compatible substitutes in an integrated
system of production”. See David P.A. and Bunn J.A. (1988), p.172;58
Adoption was quick irrespective of the high price and the new segment grew up beside
the old one of the access routers.
The case of switch is different. Switches were adopted very quickly at the beginning
because of their low price resulting from high competition in the market. Despite this,
their effect on the router market became ‘tangible’ only four years after their first
appearance in the market, when as we have seen, in 1994 new entries in the
multiprotocol sub-segment started to decrease very quickly together with the average
price. The impact due to the cross-substitution effect was weaker in the less
concentrated access router sub-segment.  Both the timing and the evidence seem to
suggest that the combination of technological characteristics and market structure
ended in delaying the substitution of routers with switches. Switches represented cheap
substitutes for routers, but the substitution might have occurred faster had the
multiprotocol routers not been such an expensive and widely adopted ‘gateway
technology’.
In the access technology industry, the technological stalemate which occurred at the
beginning of the 90’s has provided another example of how the combination of
adaptation, scarce resources, and, mainly, lack of positive feedback from within the
system, retarded the adoption of alternative technologies and their penetration into new
domains of application. Fast Ethernets, FDDI, ATM were all viable
50 substitutes for
Ethernet. All could provide the increased in bandwidth to overcome the existing
bottleneck represented by the low speed in transmission. In particular ATM was, and it
is still considered, the ‘ultimate’ access technology in terms of performance both in
terms of speed and in terms of integration of video and audio within data transmission.
The presence of so many alternatives and the official endorsement as standards of
three of them puzzled both the producers and the adopters and ended up
(accidentally?)
51 with enhancing the adoption of Fast Ethernet which could not provide
                                                          
50 “A new technology will be viable if it out-competes existing technologies on some
performance criteria, whether an element of functionality or cost.”Levinthal D.A. (1998), p.
242;
51 This strategy of endorsing ‘de jure’ several alternative standards at the same time is quite
common in the standardisation making process by official committees. It responds to the need of
these organisations to study alternative nascent network technologies in order to understand
which kind of dynamics the system will display whether one or another alternative would
prevail. The rationale behind this is to try to favour the emergence and the establishment of the
most efficient alternative. But this strategy could become counter-productive if it limits itself to
favour the proliferation of alternatives and to a passive wait-and-see. A passivity state would
allow for network externalities to play a lead role in supporting the solution which is more59
the integration of data, audio, video. To support the entry into a new domain of
application the official endorsement of three alternatives at the same time induced firms
to spread their already scarce resources on several technologies and increased the
uncertainty about which one might have prevailed in the market.  In this context, the
chance of sponsoring one technology which could reveal itself as the least efficient in
the market both lowered the expected benefits and increased the opportunity costs for
firms. The expected benefits decreased since the presence of incompatible access
technologies reduced the width of the potential installed base. The opportunity costs
increased because the need to recoup the ‘sunk-costs’ of the investment might induce
the firm not to switch to the sponsorship of another technology had the one supported
not been adopted.
Moreover the introduction of the switch, which addressed the same needs more
cheaply, while had major chances of being adopted and which released the network
communication from the ‘slavery’ of protocol compatibility, lowered further both the
incentives to engage in the competition in the access technology market and the
reinforcing feedback coming from the network externalites. In the presence of such high
competition and uncertainty the technology with higher compatibility with the existing
installed base prevailed and the invasion of another application domain such as video-
voice-data transmission was delayed.
3.3.2 The demand side
The problems highlighted above resulted mainly from the combination of scarce
resources and network externalities. In the presence of network externalities and
compatibility issues, even if the increase in the capacity provided by each innovation is
bigger than the capacity demanded by the new domain of application where the
technology is applied before invading the mainstream market
52 and even if there is a
high degree of pervasiveness of the technology, the induced demand from the new
application may be influenced either positively or negatively by the presence or absence
of feedback coming from within the system.
                                                                                                                                                                            
compatible with already existing deep-installed base technologies which does not necessarily
represent the most efficient among the available alternatives. See David P.A. (1987), p.228-236;
52 This is the case in the account provided by Christensen and Rosenbloom of the disk drive
industry.
See Christensen C. and Rosenbloom R. (1995);60
 Nevertheless, once we allow for the above effects to take effect, we should consider
that the process of lineage may be delayed also by retardation and mismatches in the
process of adaptation. Usually the theory tends to assume that the adaptation process
occurs automatically since for given needs “a technology naturally adapts to the niche to
which it is being applied”.
53 Actually for a given technological paradigm we should talk
more of the convergence of two distinct processes rather than simple adaptation
underlying the lineage process. The state and evolution of product performance
demanded is on one side. The evolution of the improvements in performance supplied
by firms is on the other side. Both are driven by different determinants and there is no
reason for them either to be identical or to converge automatically.
A LAN is a technical system made of different components but from the economic
viewpoint it is also a final product whose final performance depends on the
characteristics of its components.
54 Users’ demands depend on the relationship
between their individual preferences and the products’ final performance but this
performance is the result of the evolution of the relationships between the products and
their characteristics. This weakens the link between individual needs (as expressed by
firms preferences) and final choices. As a consequence of this, the assessment of the
final good may not change, but the final choice might change because some of the
characteristics which are considered relevant have changed.
Again the point is how does this change occur over time because this will influence the
adaptation process leading eventually to the entry into another application domain. Here
it is the reaction of firms to the change of different characteristics rather than their
assessment of the characteristics which is important in determining the outcome of the
process.
55
In the specific case of internetworking technologies, the penetration into a new
application domain has been the consequence either of a reduction in the price of the
final product via a cost reduction at the component level or of an enhancement in the
quality of the final product through the improvement in the functions displayed. The
reaction to the changes depended on firms expectations about future changes in these
                                                          
53 Levinthal D. A. (1998), p.221 (emphasis is mine);
54 We use the term characteristic for “those objective properties of things that are relevant to
choice by people”.See Lancaster K. (1971), p.6;
55 Lancaster K. (1971), p.7;61
dimensions. In particular expected product obsolescence and expectations of future
price changes seemed to have played an important role.
The alternative between the adoption of software and hardware-based switches
illustrates this point. As we have seen both the adoption of a RISC processor and the
implementation of an ASICs could  ensure the improvement in the store-and-forward
mechanism of the switches, allow them to operate at layer three and challenge the
routers’ application domain. In a context of both high market and technological
uncertainty surrounding the introduction of new products, to choose one of the two
options might constrain both users and producers’ future choices about the technology
and eventually affect the entry into new application domains.
From the producer’s viewpoint, developing an ASIC-based switch is very expensive and
risky and suppliers will engage in the project only if they can reduce the uncertainty
concerning the adoption of the product. This implies an evaluation of users’ reaction
based on an assessment of how the product will fit with the other components within the
system. The habit of introducing into the market product samples to test consumers’
reactions is a way to reduce market uncertainty.
56 The commercialisation of a product
compatible with the existing installed base is an attempt to enhance the adoption by
‘adapting’ to existing needs as expressed by the final preferences.
However this entails two risks for producers. The first one is that it exposes suppliers to
increasing competition from other incumbents. The second one is that the users’
adoption will depend also on the evaluation of how the relevant characteristics will
change in the future. For instance ASIC-based products ensure high performance at
high price but low flexibility when compared to software-based alternatives.
57 Adopters
may be more concerned with high performance than with flexibility or low price at the
moment of the adoption, but the relevance of these characteristics may be upset by a
future change in the ‘objective properties’ of the product. In the presence of fast
obsolescence
58 of the products, due both to the introduction of substitutes and to the
upgrading of existing product lines, flexibility and not high performance becomes a
priority but the presence of high sunk-costs to recoup would force adopters not to
                                                          
56 This practice is common in the semiconductor industry. See Steinmueller W.E. (1987) for an
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57 See Tab.8 for a summary of the trade-offs.
58 See Rosenberg N. (1976);62
change their products were a substitute to appear in the market. Moreover, switching
could even be more unlikely if the product achieved a wide compatibility within the
system because a single user would switch only if all the other would do the same.
59
These considerations could lower the expectations of adopters to such a point that they
might offset the expected gains from adopting the new product. As we have stressed
above, switches became viable substitutes for routers only four years after their first
introduction regardless of the fact that they had already acquired legitimacy as
substitutes for bridges and regardless of the continued fall in their price over time.
Probably such considerations delayed the application of the technology to the
mainstream domain.
3.3.3 The system
Considering how demand and supply are matched in the process of lineage means, in
this systemic context, to analyse how the dynamic of the system is affected by the
process of lineage. The analysis in the previous chapter has stressed the importance of
the matching between the two industries to achieve an equilibrium between demand
and supply and to enhance the penetration into new applications domains. Moreover it
has also stressed how difficult is to achieve this matching in presence of  innovations
changing the carrying capacity of the system and setting new resources constraints.
In presence of network externalities, when an innovation is introduced in new
application domains it may challenge the present compatibility status-quo, as the
switches challenged the compatibility between routers and the shared architecture of
Ethernet. In the absence of a new ex-ante compatibility producers’ strategies to seize
the market, and users’ preferences become strictly inter-dependent in the sense that
the matching between them was necessary for the process of lineage to acquire
momentum. Nevertheless this matching is hardly achieved and it is more likely that the
mismatching delayed the introduction of the technology into new domains of application.
The matching depends on the legitimacy acquired by the innovation and on the extent
of competition because they influence, through the density of firms in the industry, the
process of entry and exit of innovators. Nevertheless, at the level of the system the
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concepts of legitimacy/ competition and adaptation/ resource availability overlap.
Adaptation is easier when the technology enters new domains of application just by
satisfying existing needs based on established preferences (i.e. when it has already
acquired legitimacy in some other markets). The penetration into new domains is
enhanced when resources are available (i.e. when competition is low). This creates a
link between the process of lineage and the evolution of supply and demand which
affects the evolution of the system.
These considerations, together with the comments we made above about demand and
supply, change the perspective from the theoretical viewpoint. In presence of network
externalitites and compatibility issues, adaptation does not occur automatically and the
availability of resources might not be a great constraint to the process of innovation
diffusion into new domains of application. If the process of adoption becomes self-
reinforcing once it has gained enough momentum, the real problem is to match demand
and supply in the early stages of the process to acquire critical mass. One of the
possibilities is to create a large installed-base by shipping as many products as
possible. The problem with this solution is that it still emphasises the availability of
resources as a major constraint. Moreover it does not solve the problem, which is both
analytical and practical, of the existence of the demand to be met by the supply in the
earliest stage of the process. One of the possible solutions is to stress, beside the
mentioned elements, the role of producers and users’ expectations in shaping the path
of lineage by creating a pattern of demand which conforms to the characteristics of the
product whose objective properties are determined by the existing technology. In the
case we have analysed, the introduction of switches has lowered users’ expectations on
the opportunity of adopting a new access technology (FDDI) and has also delayed the
diffusion of new more efficient alternatives (ATM). Nevertheless, there is no intrinsic
reason for this mechanism to turn out to be vicious and the endorsement of an access
technology may induce such high expectations that the process of innovation is
accelerated as happened in the first phase with Ethernet and the routers.
So far, the existing literature has limited itself to analyse the role of expectations in the
diffusion of innovation either in presence of compatibility (rational expectations case)
60or
in context of comparative statics where the final state of the system is assumed and
only the effects of departures from the equilibrium position, are analysed.
61 As some
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authors have stressed, it is important to investigate the role of expectations in shaping
the path toward the final state.
62
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to fullfill the last requirement of the Schumpeterian advice we
mentioned in the introduction. To interpret the historical account and the empirical
findings of the previous chapters we needed to relate analytically the evolution of the
technology to both a theory of the demand and a theory of the supply. Moreover, we
needed to stress a possible mechanism relating both to the dynamic and to the
evolution of market structures.To frame the diffusion of the technology in new domains
as a process of lineage has seemed to provide a good starting point to achieve this
goal.
By considering the interaction between economic and technological dimensions during
the process of innovation, but by distinguishing clearly between the economic and the
technological effects of an innovation, this approach allowed us to understand how it is
possible for an innovation to have a revolutionary economic impact despite the stability
of its ‘technological core’ over time. Moreover, by stressing the adaptation and the
availability of resources as the two main elements behind the process of lineage the
approach was revealed as useful for relating the process of lineage to the evolution of
market structure. However, we have argued that the presence of network externalities
and required product compatibility within systems might blur the distinction between
adaptation and resources availability, as mechanisms underlying the process of lineage,
and beteen legitimacy and competition as mechanisms behind the dynamic of
industries. In this context demand and supply become so interdependent that the
dynamic of the system might be strongly affected positively or negatively by factors
other than the simple availability of resources necessary to sustain the process of
lineage. Expectations on the future technological evolution of the components of the
system have proved to be one important factor in the case of Local Area Network.
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CONCLUSION
We can now provide answers to the questions we introduced at the beginning and also
make some brief considerations on the methodology we have used throughout this
work.
The historical account is valuable for identifying both the technological and the
economic mechanisms behind the evolution of the LAN industry. From the technological
viewpoint, innovations at the single component level triggered further innovations in
other components. This occurred both in the first phase, when improvements in the
computer performance and the standardisation of the access technology allowed the
expansion of LANs’ installed base, and in the second phase when the adoption of
routers and the diffusion of Ethernet over twisted-pair, by segmenting the network but
potentially extending it at the same time, highlighted the problems of bandwidth
shortage and eventually led to the introduction of the switches as a solution of this
problem. Cross-substitution and compatibility issues mirrored this pattern from the
economic viewpoint. Nevertheless, they exerted uneven and contradictory effects on
the evolution of the system according to the different phases, the different market
segments, and the presence or absence of innovation. As long as both Ethernet and
Token Ring were not challenged by any alternative, compatibility was a relatively
‘irrelevant’ issue and new, most viable substitutes, both terminal equipment and
networking products (routers as substitutes for bridges), were quickly introduced in the
market and enhanced the expansion of the overall system.
When alternative technologies or products appeared the picture changed and
compatibility and substitution started to collide. Maintaining the compatibility with the
existing installed base became the main concern behind firms’ decisions and this ended
up in delaying or even preventing the substitution of existing products with new
technologically viable alternatives. This happened both in the case of  access
technologies, where the presence of the more compatible Fast Ethernet delayed the
diffusion of FDDI, and for the internetworking devices where the status of ‘gateway
technology’ of routers delayed the introduction of switches as their substitutes and
instead started a process of technological convergence of the two products. Beside
these effects which occurred within each industry, changes affected also the
relationships  between the industries at the system level. The introduction of the cheaper
switches further delayed the development and diffusion of an alternative and viable66
‘switched’ access technology (ATM). The persistence on the practice of developing a
‘shared’ alternative access technology to maintain compatibility did not reinforce the
diffusion of switches in use and their impact on the market was further delayed.
To highlight the effects of compatibility and cross-substitution we chose to analyse
changes in the dynamic of the industries and of the system over time. To pursue this
goal we applied the ‘second technique’ suggested by Schumpeter, statistics, within the
theoretical framework of the Organisational Ecology approach. Within this framework,
the rate of entry and exit of firms are linked to the number of incumbents (density) in the
industry through the concepts of legitimacy and competition. Moreover, the dynamic of
entry and exit depends on the amount of resources available (carrying capacity) within
the industry or the system. Carrying capacities, and the dynamic of entry and exit, may
be altered if an innovation occurs. For the purpose of our analysis we took legitimacy
and competition as proxies for compatibility and cross-substitution respectively. In our
analysis of the access technology industry (1984-1989), we found out that in absence of
innovation challenging the existing technological compatibility (i.e. given the carrying
capacities and in presence of high legitimacy), the pattern conformed to the theory and
displayed an increasing ‘competition effect’ as density increased and the exhaustion of
the available resources was approached. In this case the presence of high cross-
substitution effect in the internetworking market did not negatively affect either the
dynamic of the access technology industry or of the matching between industries at the
level of the system. On the contrary by investigating the dynamic of the internetworking
industry (1993-1997), our findings showed that when an innovation has altered the
existing carrying capacities, the pattern does not conform to the theory but displays a
weak ‘density effect’ both on legitimacy and competition. Since, in this case, firms were
mainly concerned, in the access technology industry, with gaining legitimacy for new
products the issue of compatibility became relevant. Both the dynamic of the
internetworking industry and the dynamic of the system were negatively affected.
The last step was to provide a ‘theory’ consistent both with the historical account and
with the assumptions made in the empirical investigation and at the same time provide
hints and starting points for further analysis. To portrait the ‘branching’ of the technology
into new application domains as a process of lineage allowed us to capture the trade-
offs in the technological evolution between the increasing complexity at the component
level and the decreasing complexity at the system level. Nevertheless, this introduced
the problem of consistency, at the analytical level, between the assumptions behind this67
process and our assumptions. The process of lineage describes the introduction of
technology into new domains of application in the presence of enough resources to
sustain penetration. The process of adaptation to existing needs, which is the required
mechanism on the demand side, is considered by earlier writers employing the lineage
concept, to follow almost automatically. Our empirical analysis has shown that the
matching between demand and supply, as we can consider the access technology and
the internetworking industry at this level of abstraction, does not occur automatically but
the theory, by stressing mainly the supply side or by assuming the compatibility ex-ante,
does not seem to consider this possibility. However, the assumption of ex-ante
compatibility is both unrealistic, since producers can gain higher benefits by sponsoring
a proprietary technology and trying to have it accepted by the users, and theoretically
demanding, since we must assume an instantaneous matching between producers’
decisions and users’ needs. We stressed that, in a context of network externalities, we
can drop that assumption if we assume, more realistically as our historical account has
shown, that producers endogenously create the demand for their products.
Nevertheless if we assume that, then producers’ decisions will be a function of their
expectations on users’ behaviour. Only when expectations are matched at the
beginning, will the process of diffusion into another domain occur evenly and reach
momentum as users’ decision will depend, as usual in a context of network
externalities, on previous decisions of other adopters. We can still assume that
producers maintain rational expectations about users’ decisions, but again this seems
to be an exception rather than the rule as we tried to show in our analysis of the LAN
industry.68
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